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Rebuilding the Barriers: The Trend in
Employment Discrimination
Class Actions'
By Judith J. Johnson*
INTRODUCTION
Congress intended that employees vindicate the rights given them
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by private action. 2 For
several years private actions proved to be very successful in eliminating
employment discrimination.3 Recent decisions of the Supreme Court and
lower courts have limited the effectiveness of the private employment
discrimination suit as a major deterrent and remedy for such discrimina-
tion.4 This is especially true in the area of class action suits, which have
been the single most effective tool in eliminating employment discrimina-
tion.5 Many courts today interpret Rule 23, the federal rule governing
* Associate Professor of Law, Mississippi College of Law. B.A. University of
Texas at Austin, 1969; J.D., University of Mississippi, 1974. I would like to thank
Craig Callen, Cecile Edwards, Howard Fenton, William Page, J. Allen Smith, and Craig
Turner for editorial assistance and Bruce Thompson for editorial and research assistance.
1. The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is ". . . to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees." Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
2. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e. "Suits brought by private employees are the cutting
edge of the Title VII sword which Congress has fashioned to fight a major enemy . . .
[to] continuing progress, strength, and solidarity in our nation, discrimination in employ-
ment." Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 254 (3d Cir. 1975). See infra
text accompanying note 22.
3. See infra notes 21-22.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 57-99. &e, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 800 (5th Cir. 1986) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. granted,
107 S.Ct. 3227 (1987).
5. See infra notes 21-22.
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class action suits, so restrictively that such suits are becoming unworkable.
6
The present trend is the result of more than a decade of debate
among scholars, courts, and lawyers regarding how courts should apply
Rule 23 to employment discrimination suits. In the early years of employ-
ment discrimination suits, courts substantially relaxed the requirements
of Rule 23, sometimes ignoring them altogether. Courts assumed that
since employment discrimination was an injury to a class, most employ-
ment discrimination cases should be automatically certified as class
actions .
7
Opponents of such permissive certification argued that Rule 23 should
be applied strictly and narrowly by requiring that the class represen-
tative only represent persons whose claims are virtually identical to his
or hers. The result of such restrictive certifications was that the courts
can rarely find a sufficiently numerous class of persons who have such
identical claims. The courts are then" compelled to deny class certifica-
tion for lack of numerosity (one of the requirements of Rule 23).'
The movement toward restrictive certification, resulting in the pre-
sent trend, has been gaining strength over the past ten years. 9 Some
proponents of restrictive certification believe that since Title VII has been
the law for over twenty years, its objective has been achieved and
employers should no longer be harassed by threats of massive class ac-
tion suits. While it is no doubt true that there is less blatant discrimina-
tion today than formerly, it must also be recognized that many employers
still tolerate subtle - and in some cases not so subtle - forms of
discrimination which cannot be ferreted out by individual actions. 10
6. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986);
Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1073 (1984); Abron v. Black & Decker (U.S.), 654 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 39-41, 48.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 214-17.
9. See infra notes 37-99.
10. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 815 (5th Cir.
1986) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 3227 (1987); Palmer v. Schultz,
815 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (lengthy discussion of the legal principals that apply
to pattern or practice disparate treatment claims); Hammon v. Barry, 813 F.2d 412,
433-47 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Lengthy dissent by Circuit Judge Mikva concerning the failure
of the majority to consider properly the effect of the past pattern or practice of race
discrimination on the racial composition of the Fire Department of the District of Col-
umbia. The majority had reversed a lower court decision upholding race-conscious hir-
ing .provisions of the affirmative action plan of the Fire Department.); Morris v. Bran-
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The thesis of this article is that restrictive certification, as predicted
early on, is draining the life out of Title VII." Class actions are a
necessary tool to vindicate Title VII rights, and the courts should not
eliminate such actions in deference to a false assumption that only a
person with the same claim as the class can be an adequate represen-
tative. The courts are expecting a perfect class representative, thus ig-
noring the realities of Title VII litigation. It is difficult for anyone to
sue his or her employer. Class representatives are not as likely to pre-
sent themselves in such suits as in other litigation. Furthermore, only
the largest employers employ enough people with identical current claims
to fill a class. Therefore, the present trend must be reversed. If class
actions are to be a viable tool in the enforcement of Title VII, the courts
must be willing to certify smaller classes and to accept as a class represen-
tative one whose claims are related, but not identical, to the claims of
the class.
This article analyzes the present trend in a historical context and
suggests solutions which allow the courts to take into consideration the




Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,12 which was designed
to eliminate all vestiges of employment discrimination, was one of the
most controversial pieces of legislation ever to be passed by Congress.
I 3
chini, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 674 (E.D. Va. 1987) (example of an over-
whelming finding of evidence of pattern or practice of sex discrimination involving a
single plaintiff); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1229
n.24 (2d ed. 1983).
11. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Godbold, J., concurring).
12. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
13. See generally Vaas, Title VII Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV.
431, 431-32 (1966). Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment based on race,
religion, sex, color, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a) (1982).
As a practical matter, such legislation could not be delayed much longer. Hostile
racial conflicts were occurring on a daily basis, and the battle for black participation
in American society was raging. President John F. Kennedy, in a message to Congress,
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The proponents originally modelled the Act after the National Labor
Relations Act, giving the agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the same enforcement powers as the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has under the Act. 14 In order to weaken the Act and to
make it more palatable to its opponents, however, later compromises
stripped the EEOC of enforcement powers. 5 Congress intended to leave
enforcement of the Act in the hands of private parties and the courts
to overcome fears that EEOC enforcement would be too vigorous.16 Thus,
it is ironic that the courts found in the class action suit an even more
urging passage of what was to become the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "warned of 'a
rising tide of discontent that threatens the public safety' in many parts of the country."
Civil Rights and Job Opportunities - Message From the President of the United States,
H.R. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 11174, 11174 (1963). After a review of the
limited progress in five areas (equal accommodations in public facilities, desegregation
of schools, fair and full employment, community relations service, and federal programs),
President Kennedy in his conclusion stressed again the real danger of legislative inac-
tion. Id. at 11179.
See also Daly, Stotts' Denial of Hiring and Promotion Preferences for Non- Victims: Draining
the "Spirit"from Title VII, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 17, 58 (1986); Note, Deterred Non-
applicants in Title VII Class Actions: Examining the Limits of Equal Employment Opportunity,
64 B.U.L. REV. 151, 154 n.25 (1984); Note, Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corporation:
Eviscerating Title VII, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 987, 990 n.19-20 (1983).
14. 29 U.S.C. SS 153-56, 159-61 (1982). The NLRB has the power to issue
cease and desist orders and to enforce them in court. For legislative history see H.R.
REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2391, 2401. See also Additional Majority View of Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier, 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2409, 2411; Additional Views of Hon. George Meader,
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2412, 2426-27; Vaas, supra note 11.
15. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 707(b), reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2391, 2404. See Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824, 829-30 (1972).
The Act authorized the Attorney General to proceed if there was reasonable cause
to believe that the defendant had engaged in a pattern or practice of employment
discrimination. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-6(a) (1982).
Under the present procedure, which is largely unchanged, the charging party files
a charge, and the EEOC conducts an investigation and makes a determination whether
there is reasonable cause to believe discrimination has occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
to (d) (1982). The Commission then attempts conciliation, and if unsuccessful, the charg-
ing party receives a right to sue letter. He or she then brings suit in federal court for
a de novo determination on his or her claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O(3) (1982).
16. See Sape & Hart, supra note 15, at 830-32; Rutherglen, Title VII Class Ac-
tions, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 688, 696 (1980).
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effective enforcement vehicle than vigorous EEOC enforcement would
have been.17
It soon became apparent that the public role in the enforcement
of Title VII was inadequate. 18 As a result, in 1971, along with other
amendments to Title VII, Congress again considered giving the EEOC
power to issue cease and desist orders.' 9 Opponents argued that the federal
courts were enforcing the statutes effectively through the class action
mechanism. 20
The bill which passed the House would have essentially eliminated
the use of class actions in Title VII cases by requiring that all class
members file, or be named in, the charge.2 ' Congress ultimately rejected
that provision, and the conference committee endorsed the use of class
actions by agreeing that "Title VII actions are by their very nature class
complaints, and that any restriction on such actions would greatly under-
mine the effectiveness of Title VII.
' ' 22
17. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1969).
See also Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1001-05 (11th Cir. 1982)
(filing of an EEOC charge is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintenance of
Title VII class action); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 289-90 (5th
Cir. 1969) rev'g 290 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Miss. 1967) (discussing the policy of concilia-
tion as applied to the roles of the EEOC and Title VII).
18. The Attorney General pursued only a few big cases, and the EEOC was
swamped by a burgeoning backlog. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 933; Sape
& Hart, supra note 15, at 846 & 889; Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 694.
19. Proponents of EEOC cease and desist power introduced bills each session
after Title VII passed. See Sape & Hart, supra note 15, at 830-37.
20. See Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 713-16.
21. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § (3)(e) (1971). Furthermore, the conference
committee spokesman agreed that in areas in which the committee had not acted to
the contrary, it was to be assumed that present case law developed by the courts would
continue to govern Title VII cases. See Sape & Hart, supra note 15, at 846.
22. One inference that can be drawn from this legislative history is that had
the courts been less successful in securing compliance with Title VII, the support for
granting cease and desist power to the EEOC would certainly have been more vigorous.
S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1971). The 1972 amendments, inter alia,
gave the EEOC power to sue in individual cases and transferred the responsibility for
pattern and practice suits in the private sector to the EEOC. Charge filing and limita-
tion periods were also extended. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(f)(1), 2000e-(6)(c), 2000e-16 (1982).
See Rutherglen, supra note 16, for a different interpretation but a good discussion of
the legislative history of Title VII and the 1972 amendments.
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B. Class Actions Generally
Thus, Congress left the enforcement of Title VII in the hands of
the courts and gave its imprimatur to eradication of discrimination through
private class action suits. An allegation of employment discrimination,
however, is not enough to maintain a class action suit. Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a class of persons exist
and that the plaintiff be an adequate representative of that class. The




In order to determine whether the class representative can adequately
represent a class, the court must decide whether the class meets the prere-
quisites of Rule 23(a), 24 and whether the action falls into one of the
three categories of class suits described in Rule 23(b).
25
23. 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
S 1765 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE]. At least prior to the recent
cases interpreting the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Falcon and Rodriguez, this was
especially true in Title VII cases, because of Title VII's "remedial and humanitarian
underpinnings" and "the crucial role played by the private litigant in the statutory
scheme." Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1970). See
Smalls, Class Action Under Title VII: Some Current Procedural Problems, 25 AM. U. L. REV.
821, 822 (1976).
"Rule 23 is a remedial rule that should be liberally construed and applied." 3B
J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02[4] (2d ed. 1985)
[hereinafter MOORE]. See Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir.
1975); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Escott v. Barchris
Construction Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965);
Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 90 F.R.D. 263 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Gerstle v. Con-
tinental Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 213 (D. Colo. 1970); 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra,
at S 1754. "The court should determine as soon as practicable after the lawsuit begins
whether it should be maintained as a class action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
24. Rule 23(a) provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the in-
terests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
25. Rule 23(b) provides:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class ac-
tion if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied and in addition:
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The four requirements of Rule 23(a) are sufficient numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. 26 Of these,
commonality 27 is closely related to the third requirement, which has given
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party oppos-
ing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive
of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their abil-
ity to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of laws or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the con-
troversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the in-
terest of members of the class individually controlling the prosecu-
tion or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by
or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of
a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
26. See supra note 24.
27. Since the disjunctive is used, the court need find only common questions
of law or fact. See MOORE, supra note 23, at 23.06-1.
In civil rights cases prior to General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982),
as the foundation of across-the-board certification, the courts have found that common
questions of law or fact existed when discrimination was alleged. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). The "Damoclean threat of
a racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial class [and] is a question of fact
common to all the members of the class." Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp.
184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966). One commentator has opined that the commonality re-
quirement is superfluous and that courts tend to apply it vaguely, because it is a necessary
ingredient in determining that the case falls into one of the categories under Rule 23(b).
7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 23, at § 1763. See Strickler, Protecting the Class:
The Search for the Adequate Representative in Class Action Litigation, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 73,
98-100 (1984).
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courts the most trouble, typicality. Under the third requirement, the
claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the
claims or defenses of the class. 28 Courts tend to merge the typicality
requirement with commonality, or with the fourth requirement, ade-
quate representation by the class representative.
29
Because courts tend to merge typicality, commonality, and adequacy
of representation, commentators suggest the following analysis: Rule
23(a)(1) focuses on who the proposed class members are and requires
that they be identified and that joinder be impracticable; Rule 23(a)(2)
focuses on the claims of the class and requires a commonality of rela-
tionship between those claims; Rule 23(a)(3) focuses on the claim of the
class representative and requires that it have the essential characteristics
common to the class claims; Rule 23(a)(4) looks at all facts regarding
the representative and requires that he adequately represent the class.3 0
The Supreme Court has made it clear that adequacy of representa-
tion is constitutionally required.3 1 Since class action decrees bind the
class,3 2 the class representative must adequately represent the class in
order for the decree to comport with due process of law.3 3 The re-
quirements of typicality and commonality bear heavily on adequacy of
representation. Thus a central problem is how closely connected the claims
of the representative and of the class must be to assure adequate represen-
tation. Courts which hold that the claims must be identical or co-extensive
are obviously applying the requirement too restrictively.3 4 How similar
the claims must be is the subject of much disagreement and is at the
core of the conflict between the restrictive and liberal theories of class
certifications .3
5
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). See 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 23, at
S 1764.
29. See 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 23, at S 1764; Strickler, supra
note 27, at 100-02; Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 698.
30. Professor Moore suggests that courts should attempt to give independent mean-
ing to Rule 23(a)(3) rather than needlessly interpret the various subsections of the Rule
as confluent. MOORE, supra note 23, at 23.06-2. See Strickler, supra note 27, at 97-99.
31. See generally Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
33. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
34. 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 23, at § 1764.
35. If the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met, the class must then fit into one
of the categories under Rule 23(b). FED. R. Clv. P. 23(b). The advisory committee
note to the 1966 amendments to the rule indicates that Rule 23(b)(2) was intended to
function as an effective vehicle for bringing suits alleging discrimination. Amendments
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C. Historical Background: The Development of the Across-the-Board
Theory of Class Certification
As the law developed under Title VII, the courts accepted the respon-
sibility, delegated to them by Congress, of eliminating employment
to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966) (Advisory Committee's Note
to Rule 23(b)(2)). Professor Rutherglen believes that this result is unwarranted and that
certification under (b)(1) or (b)(3), depending on the issues involved, would also be
in keeping with the nature of the suit. Rutherglen, Notice, Scope, and Preclusion in Title
VII Class Actions, 69 VA. L. REV. 11 (1983) [hereinafter Rutherglen, Notice, Scope and
Preclusion]. Rutherglen reasons:
An action to restructure hiring or promotion practices, or to reform a senior-
ity system, meets the requirements of subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) of Rule
23. Such actions fall under subdivision (b)(1) if individual actions might re-
quire the employer to establish inconsistent employment practices or might,
as a practical matter, affect the interests of other employees not party to in-
dividual actions. They fall under subdivision (b)(2) if the disputed employ-
ment practice applies generally to the class, and class-wide injunctive or
delcaratory relief might be appropriate.
Id. at 20 (footnote omitted).
Professor Rutherglen believes that such class allegations are equally amenable to
treatment under Rule 23(b)(3), since they also seek individual compensatory relief. Id.
at 23.
However most Tide VII classes proceed under subsection (b)(2) because the plaintiffs
generally seek an injunction to halt discriminatory practices, and relief will then benefit
the class as a whole. See 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, at § 1771; MOORE,
supra note 23, at 23.1[10-2], 23.40. Monetary relief in the form of backpay is com-
monly requested; however, (b)(2) is still appropriate because the relief sought is equitable
in nature. MOORE, supra note 23, at 23.40[4].
In addition to the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), two other prerequisites
are often cited: a definable class must exist, and the representative must be a member
of the class he seeks to represent. 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 23, at
§ 1759. The first requirement, it would appear, is really a restatement of the Rule 23(a)(1)
requirement of numerosity and (a)(3) requirement of typicality. See generally Warren,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Class Action Litigation, 34 BAYLOR L. REV.
177, 183 (1982). Furthermore, the requirement that the representative be a member
of the class assures that he or she has standing to represent the class. Standing is used
to insure a constitutional case or controversy as well as to require that there be sufficient
nexus between the representative and the class. The nexus requirement is really a restate-
ment of typicality to ensure adequacy of representation. MOORE, supra note 23, at
23.04[2]. Thus, whether these last requirements are additional to Rule 23(a) is debatable.
The final provision of Rule 23 identifies, inter alia, the court's role in class action
litigation. Rule 23(c)(1) provides that the court must determine as soon as is practicable
whether the class action is maintainable. The order may be conditional and may be
altered or amended at any time before decision on the merits. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1).
Subsection (d) gives the trial court discretion to make orders for the conduct of the
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discrimination. They extensively used the mechanism of the class action
suit for this purpose. The Fifth Circuit took and maintained the lead,
treating allegations of discrimination as appropriate for class treatment
in most cases. 36 It developed an across-the-board theory of class cer-
tification based on the concept that if the employer discriminates, as
to race, in one instance, then he or she discriminates in all. "Racial
discrimination is by definition class discrimination. If it exists, it applies
throughout the class."37 Therefore, when a class action was alleged under
class action. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d). Subsection (c)(4) permits the court to divide the
class into subclasses and maintain the class as to particular issues. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(4). Rule 23 lodges power in the court to supervise and direct the class action and
protect the members of the class. See MOORE, supra note 23, at 23.02-1; Rutherglen,
supra note 16, at 691. Subsection (e) requires court approval of all settlements, as well
as such notice to the class as the court directs. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Finally, subsection
(c)(3) provides that a judgment rendered in all three types of class actions is res judicata
as to all members of the class except those who have opted out of classes certified under
Rule 23(b)(3). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
Unlike Rule 23(b)(2), Rule 23(b)(3) requires notice and an opportunity to opt
out. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-76 (1974) (Rule 23(b)(3)
requires notice of right to opt out); Penson v. Terminal Transport Co., 634 F.2d 989,
993-94 (5th Cir. 1981) (Rule 23(b)(2) does not require notice of right to opt out). See
also 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 23, at § 1786.
36. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight System, 505 F.2d 40 (5th
Cir. 1974), vacated, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d
441 (5th Cir. 1973); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Oatis
v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); see generally, Anderson, Title
VII Class Actions: The Era of the Irrelevant Plaintiff, 36 MERCER L. REv. 907, 907-09 (1985).
37. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
The concept that racial discrimination is by definition class discrimination was expanded
by the Fifth Circuit in Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
In Oatis the district court had limited the class to those persons who had filed charges
with the EEOC. The Fifth Circuit rejected this idea and said that to require every
employee to file a charge "would tend to frustrate our system of justice and order."
Id. at 499. The court believed the better approach would be for one person to raise
the issue before the EEOC and bring an action for himself and all others similarly situated.
The court quoted the Supreme Court's decision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
390 U.S. 400 (1968), for the proposition that suits under Title VII are private only
in form, and that one who obtains injunctive relief does so as a " 'private attorney
general', vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority." Id. at
499. Because "[r]acial discrimination is by definition class discrimination" the court
went on to say that the class action must of course meet the requirements of Rule 23(a)
and (b)(2) and stated without elaboration that the requirements were met. Id.
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Title VII, the position of the adherents to the across-the-board theory
was that the requirements of Rule 23 should be loosened substantially
to allow certification of a broad-based class action whenever possible.3 8
The common question was racial discrimination. The plaintiffs claim
was typical if he allegedly had been aggrieved by racial discrimination.
Thus, if the class representative alleged racial discrimination, then he
could represent a class of all black persons alleging discrimination and
employed by the defendants.3 9
The across-the-board class action mechanism sometimes led to ex-
treme results. Some courts blatantly ignored the requirements of Rule
23 in order to achieve the Congressional policy of Title VII. In such
cases almost any allegation of discrimination was sufficient to justify cer-
Shortly thereafter, the Fifth Circuit decided Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400
F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968). The court rejected the employer's claim that the plaintiff's
claim was made moot by the latter's acceptance of the promotion that he alleged had
been denied in a discriminatory fashion. The court stated:
[w]ith so much riding on the claim of the private suitor, the possibility that
in this David-Goliath confrontation economic pressures will be at work toward
acceptance of preferred post-suit jobs and the equal possibility that an employer
would devise such a resist-and-withdraw tactic as a means of continuing its
former way calls for the trial court to keep consciously aware of time-tested
principles particularly in the area of public law.
400 F.2d at 33.
The court based its decision on its conviction that congressional intent was to
leave enforcement of Title VII in the hands of the individual claimants. As the court
said of such a claimant, "that individual, often obscure, takes on the mantle of the
sovereign." Id. at 32. The fact that he is charging discrimination embues the charge
with "heavy overtones of public interest." Whether in name or not, the suit is preforce
a sort of class action for fellow employees similarly situated." Id. at 33. The court reversed
the trial judge's decision that no common question of law or fact existed, because the
trial level decision was based on the fact that different circumstances surrounded the
different jobs of the members of the class. The appellate court rejected the employer's
argument that, due to the representative's promotion, no class existed, since the represen-
tative had alleged "plant-wide system-wide racially discriminatory employment prac-
tices." He was therefore still entitled to an injunction and backpay, if he prevailed.
Id. at 33-34. The court said that there was no question regarding adequate representa-
tion and that the trial court could divide the class into subclasses if necessary. Id. at 35.
38. See Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1973).
39. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969);
Hall v. Werthan Bay Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1
tification of a class action.4 0 Thus the policy of Title VII came into con-
flict with the policy behind Rule 23.41
The Fifth Circuit first articulated the across-the-board theory of class
actions in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express.42 The lower court had limited
the scope of the class to those employees discharged because of race.
The Fifth Circuit held that the trial judge's narrow definition of the
class was inappropriate, because the suit was an " 'across the board'
attack on unequal employment practices alleged to have been commit-
ted by the appellee pursuant to its policy of racial discrimination."
43
The complaint described various acts of discrimination and asserted
a company-wide policy of discrimination. The court of appeals, therefore,
reasoned that the plaintiff intended to represent all employees harmed
by the alleged discrimination, whether it manifested itself in discharge,
hiring, promotion, or segregated facilities.
The significance of Johnson is not just that its court was first to app-
ly the term "across-the-board." The formulation was not refined in that
case. Johnson's importance lies in Judge Godbold's concurrence. In his
concurrence he presaged concerns which were to develop later regarding
the "across-the-board" theory. 44 Since the pleadings did not define a
class by acts, time, persons, plant supervisors, or other particulars, Judge
Godbold stated that the
appellant has done no more than name the preserve on which
he intends to hunt. Over-technical limitation of classes by district
courts will drain the life out of Title VII . . . . But without
reasonable specificity the court cannot define the class, cannot
determine whether the representation is adequate, and the
employer does not know how to defend.
4 5
Judge Godbold cautioned that an overly-broad class would be so unfair
40. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); see generally
Anderson, supra note 36, at 907-08.
41. For policy behind Rule 23, see supra text accompanying note 23.
42. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
43. Id. at 1124.
44. Judge Godbold clarified what the appellate court was telling the district court:
that the district court had defined the class too narrowly. Instead it must precisely define
the class considering "the tests of adequate representation, protection of the interests
of the class, and manageability of the lawsuit." Id. at 1125 (Godbold, J.,
concurring).
45. Id. at 1126.
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to absent members as to amount to deprivation of due process. He also
concluded that the broad class action is "dandy for the employees if
their champion wins," but catastrophic if he loses "or proves only such
limited facts that no practice or policy can be found, leaving him afloat
but sinking the class .... ",46
Judge Godbold's warning was not heeded. The Fifth Circuit's across-
the-board theory of class certification was accepted by virtually every
circuit, 47 and it seemed that the mere allegation of class discrimination
was sufficient to warrant certification. Plaintiffs' lawyers developed "boiler
plate" class action pleadings which were often scrutinized only slightly
by the courts.4 8
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight
System4 9 was the pinnacle of the across-the-board theory. Its reversal by
46. Id.
47. Senter v. General Motors, 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 870 (1976); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Parham
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). But cf. Taylor v. Safeway
Stores, 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
48. See, e.g., Senter, 532 F.2d at 524 ("The operative fact in an action under
Title VII is that an individual has been discriminated against because he was a member
of a class."); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340-41 (10th Cir. 1975)
(The action of the district court in reducing the class "to those individuals only who
were of the same race or ethnic origin and who performed the same job" if allowed
"would effectively make Rule 23 a nullity."); Barnett, 518 F.2d at 547 ("Viewed broad-
ly, [the plaintiffs] suit is an 'across the board' attack on all discriminatory actions by
defendants on the ground of race, and when so viewed it fits comfortably within the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(2)."); Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight System, 505
F.2d 40, 50 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) ("[Tlhe re-
quirements of Rule 23(a) must be read liberally in the context of suits brought under
Title VII .... Suits brought under these provisions are inherently class suits."); Long
v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 43 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[S]he occupies the position of one she says
is suffering from the alleged discrimination. She has demonstrated the necessary nexus
with the proposed class for membership therein."); Tipler v. E.I. DuPont deNemours
and Co., 443 F.2d 125, 131 (6th Cir. 1971) (In discussing the scope of a complaint
"federal courts should not allow procedural technicalities to preclude Title VII com-
plaints."); Parham, 433 F.2d at 428 ("Parham's failure to establish his claim for in-
dividual damages will not bar relief for the class he represents. The very nature of a
Title VII violation rests upon discrimination against a class characteristic, i.e., race,
religion, sex or national origin."); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715
(7th Cir. 1969) ("When . . . the alleged discrimination has been practiced on the plain-
tiff because he or she is a member of a class which is allegedly discriminated against,
the trial court bears a special responsibility in the public interest to resolve the dispute
by determining the facts regardless of the position of the individual plaintiff.").
49. 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
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the Supreme Court in 1977 marked the onset of retrenchment from broad
certifications. In Rodriguez the district court had dismissed a class action
which alleged discrimination by a trucking company against blacks and
Mexican-Americans. 50 The trial court dismissed the class after the trial,
because the plaintiffs had failed to move for class certification or to offer
proof of liability or damages as to the class. s ' Furthermore, the plaintiffs
had stipulated before trial that the only issue before the court involved
the plaintiffs' individual claims.
Although the lower court had found that the plaintiffs were not
qualified, because or their age, weight, and driving records, to be road-
drivers, the Fifth Circuit chose not to comment on this finding.52 Rather,
it reversed the case as to the plaintiffs and certified the class on appeal,
stating that there was no serious dispute that the plaintiffs satisfied the
first three criteria of Rule 23(a).53
The only analysis the Fifth Circuit attempted was with regard to
adequacy of representation. The defendants had offered evidence that
the plaintiffs had acted in a manner antagonistic to the interests of the
class. The evidence was based on the fact that a majority of the minor-
ity members of the union had rejected the relief requested by the plain-
tiffs in the complaint.5 4 The court found that the union meeting vote
50. It was a common practice at that time to hire minorities as city drivers to
deliver merchandise locally, but to exclude them from over-the-road jobs, which paid
more and were considered more prestigious. The defendant, East Texas Motor Freight
Co. had, in addition, followed a "no transfer" policy prohibiting drivers from transfer-
ring between the two job classifications. Thus, in order for a city driver to become
an over-the-road driver, he had to resign his city driving job and relinquish his senior-
ity. As a further barrier, he had to have had three years "immediate prior line haul
road experience," which obviously was impossible for city drivers to meet. 505 F.2d
at 46-48. The plaintiffs had applied for over-the-road jobs in 1970, and East Texas
Motor Freight Co. stipulated that the applications had never been considered. The Fifth
Circuit properly found that these policies were discriminatory, since the defendant had
never hired a minority person as an over-the-road driver until one of the plaintiffs filed
an EEOC charge in 1970. Id. at 48. At that time three Mexican-Americans were hired.
No blacks had ever been hired, and 35% of the city drivers were black or Mexican-
American. Id. at 48.
51. Id. at 49.
52. Id. See infra text accompanying note 61.
53. Id. at 50.
54. Plaintiffs had requested that the separate city and over-the-board drivers'
seniority lists be merged to create a single seniority system based on the employee's
date of hire by the company. Id. at 50.
[Vol. 19:1
1987] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS 15
rejecting such relief was not as significant as the company urged, since
voters included employees of other companies and only represented the
opinion of one local, rather than including employees from all the areas
covered by the company. 5 The court concluded that Title VII and Sec-
tion 1981 had been violated and remanded the case to the trial court
for determination of a remedy within the limits described.
5 6
D. East Texas Motor Freight System v. Rodriguez
As the across-the-board theory was reaching its zenith in the courts
of appeal, the Supreme Court changed the direction of the developments
in class actions and attempted at least to refine across-the-board suits.
It reversed the Fifth Circuit in East Texas Motor Freight System v. Rodriguez.
57
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in certifying
the class under the facts of the case. 58 The Court determined that the
plaintiffs were not adequate representatives of the class. It cited as error
the Fifth Circuit's discounting of the plaintiffs' failure to move for class
certification, the circuit court's disregard of the stipulation in the trial
55. Id. at 50-51. The court did not comment on the significance for adequacy
of representation purposes of the plaintiffs' failure to move for class certification and
stipulation that the trial only involved the plaintiffs' individual claims. The court did
note that in a colloquy between the trial judge and the plaintiffs' attorney, the attorney
urged that there was still a live class. Id. at 52. However, this also should bear on
adequacy of representation, since the plaintiffs had failed to move for such certification
prior to the trial and had stipulated away the class issue.
56. We hold, not that all minority city drivers with three years experience
at city driving must be permitted to transfer, but only that they may not
be excluded unless they fail to meet other qualifications that either have no
disparate impact along racial or national-origin lines or that can be justified
as essential for safety or efficiency.
Id. at 62.
57. East Texas Motor Freight System v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
58. The Supreme Court made it clear, in the recitation of facts in Rodriguez,
that the Fifth Circuit had picked and chosen from the trial record in an improper man-
ner. In order to certify the class on appeal and find class-wide liability, the Fifth Circuit
said that the case had been tried as a class action. The Supreme Court said that this
was contrary to the understanding of the trial judge and that the Fifth Circuit had quoted
a portion of a colloquy with the judge in the record out of context to support the state-
ment. In fact, "as the full colloquy reveals, the trial judge ruled that evidence concern-
ing general company practice would be admitted, not because of the class allegations,
but only because it was probative with respect to the plaintiffs' individual claims." Id.
at 402 n.6.
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court that the issues to be resolved concerned only the individual plain-
tiffs, 59 and its minimization of the antagonism evidenced by the union
meeting vote regarding relief to be requested at trial.
60
The decision hinged on the finding by the trial court that the plain-
tiffs were not qualified for the line driver positions even under non-
discriminatory criteria. The Court, therefore, held the plaintiffs were
not members of the class they purported to represent at the time the
class was certified. "As this Court has repeatedly held, a class represen-
tative must be part of the class and 'possess the same interest and suffer
the same injury' as the class members."
' 6 1
Since the plaintiffs were not qualified to be line drivers, they could
not represent persons who were qualified but were discriminatorily denied
those jobs. The Court also noted the plaintiffs' stipulation that their
employer had not discriminated against them during initial hiring. As
a result, "[plaintiffs] were hardly in a position to mount a classwide
attack on the notransfer rule and seniority system on the ground that
these practices perpetuated past discrimination and locked minorities into
the less desirable jobs to which they had been discriminatorily assigned. "62
This language has been cited as a rejection of the across-the-board
approach. Since the plaintiffs had not been aggrieved by hiring prac-
tices, they could not represent persons who had been.6 3 Taken in con-
text, however, the Court's holding meant only that the plaintiffs could
not represent a class since they had not been injured at all. Thus, Rodriguez
could have been interpreted to preclude class suits by persons not in-
jured by discrimination at all. This interpretation leaves open the possibil-
ity that "same interest" could be freedom from discrimination and "same
injury" could mean simply any act of discrimination actually experienced,
regardless of the form.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that at the end of
the opinion the Court endorsed the foundation of the across-the-board
theory:
59. See supra note 55.
60. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 404-05. The Court noted that a different case would
be presented after the class had been certified. In such a case, the class would have
independent existence. Id. at 406 n.12.
61. Id. at 403.
62. Id. at 404.
63. See Note, The Proper Scope of Representation in Title VII Class Actions: A Comment
on East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 175,
177 n.16 (1978) [hereinafter The Proper Scope of Representation].
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We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimina-
tion are often by their very nature class suits, involving classwide
wrongs. Common questions of law or fact are typically present.
But careful attention to the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
23 remains nonetheless indispensible. The mere fact that a com-
plaint alleges racial or ethnic discrimination does not in itself
ensure that the party who has brought the lawsuit will be an
adequate representative of those who may have been the real
victims of that discrimination.
64
Prior to Rodriguez, only one circuit had expressly rejected the across-
the-board theory of class certification. 65 Subsequently, many appellate
courts revised or articulated for the first time their views on across-the-
board certification. 66
Some courts believed that Rodriguez approved the across-the-board
theory, and that "same interest, same injury" could be liberally inter-
preted. 67 Others believed it unequivocally eliminated across-the-board
64. 431 U.S. at 405-06.
65. See Taylor v. Safeway Stores, 524 F.2d 263, 270-71 (10th Cir. 1975). The
theory had been rejected by some district courts. See, e.g., White v. Gates Rubber Co.,
53 F.R.D. 412, 413 (D. Colo. 1971).
66. See infra notes 67-69; Anderson, supra note 36, at 919-22 (1985); Strickler,
supra note 27, at 129-32; Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 721-24.
67. See, e.g., Falcon v. General Tel. Co., 626 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd,
457 U.S. 147 (1982). Several district courts outside the Fifth Circuit also continued
to favor its view. See, e.g., Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
153, 157 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Bartelson v. Dean Witter & Co., 86 F.R.D. 657 (E.D.
Pa. 1980); Rosario v. New York Times, 84 F.R.D. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
One such court said that "[s]ome generalization from the Rodriguez dicta is essen-
tial if the broad remedial purposes of Title VII are to be served and if Rule 23 is not
to be emasculated. Nor, in my opinion, is Rodriguez inconsistent with the policy favoring
across-the-board challenges to discriminatory employment practices." Muka v. Nicolet
Paper Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 672, 674 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (citations omit-
ted). These courts interpreted Rodriguez as applying simply to the situation in which
the named plaintiffs have not been discriminated against at all. 24 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 674. See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420, 433 (N.D.
Tex. 1979); Arnett v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 78 F.R.D. 73, 77 n.6 (D.D.C. 1978).
Other courts interpreted Rodriguez as dealing only with adequacy of representa-
tion. They found that since "the across-the-board approach is simply a judicial gloss
on the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23," Rodriguez could not be
taken as a rejection of the approach. Wajda v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 80 F.R.D.
303, 308 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See Molthan v. Temple Univ., 83 F.R.D. 368, 373 (E.D.
Pa. 1979).
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certification. 68 Still others allowed across-the-board attacks in only some
circumstances. 69 Over time, however, the trend started by Rodriguez proved
to be a retreat from across-the-board certification.
7 0
Despite the Supreme Court decision, the Fifth Circuit continued
to apply the across-the-board theory, reasoning that Rodriguez was not
contrary to its policy of favoring across-the-board certification. 71 In Falcon
v. General Telephone Co. ,72 the Fifth Circuit held that it still permitted
across-the-board attacks on discrimination and that
[ijt is therefore apparent that this court permits an employee
complaining of one employment practice to represent another
68. See, e.g., Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 273 n.7
(4th Cir. 1980); Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 581 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1978).
69. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gino's, Inc., 621 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). See also Anderson, supra note 36, at 919-22; Chapin, How
Far Across-the-Board: The Permissible Breadth of Title VII Class Actions, 24 ARiz. L. REV.
61, 70-82 (1982); Bridgesmith, Representing the Title VII Class Action: A Question of Degree,
26 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1428-36 (1980).
Still other courts said that the across-the-board theory had to be re-evaluated in
light of Rodriguez, and that the courts that interpreted it to allow continuance of such
certifications failed to deal adequately with the more general observations of the Rodriguez
Court about adherence to the requirements of Rule 23. "By limiting the impact of
Rodriguez, the courts' capacity to effectuate the purposes of Rule 23(a) would be dimin-
ished." Local 194, Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store Union v. Standard Brands, Inc.,
85 F.R.D. 599, 605 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Still others took a middle ground, finding that
the reasoning of adherents to the across-the-board theory was more persuasive, but that
all of the requirements of Rule 23, especially adequacy of representation, should be
met. See, e.g., I.M.A.G.E. v. Bailar, 78 F.R.D. 549, 555 (N.D. Cal. 1978). The Third
Circuit articulated yet a different approach: the class must first meet the requirements
of Rule 23(a), then once properly certified, some requirements of the rule may be relaxed
to permit consideration of claims that might not otherwise satisfy it. Alexander v. Gino's,
Inc., 621 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denid, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
70. See generally Anderson, supra note 36.
71. Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 993-94 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978),
vacated and remanded, 445 U.S. 940 (1980). Ironically, in Satterwhite, the Fifth Circuit
en banc did attempt to follow Rodriguez by vacating the panel opinion allowing a plain-
tiff who lost on the merits to continue to represent a class. The court en banc declared
her to be an inadequate representative under Rodriguez. The Supreme Court vacated
and remanded, citing Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980)
and United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980), which indicated
that even if the plaintiff's claim becomes moot, he or she does not necessarily lose his
or her ability to represent the class. See Strickler, supra note 27, at 131.
72. Falcon v. General Tel. Co., 626 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 457 U.S.
147 (1982).
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complaining of another practice, if the plaintiff and the members
of the class suffer from essentially the same injury. In this case,
all of the claims are based on discrimination because of national
origin. It is consistent with the holding in Rodriguez and the policy
of Title VII to allow a plaintiff to represent a class suffering
from a common discriminatory complaint. While similarities of
sex, race or national origin claims are not dispositive in favor
of finding that the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been met, they
are an extremely important factor in the determination that can
outweigh the fact that the members of the plaintiff class may
be complaining about somewhat different specific discriminatory
practices. 
7 3
At the other end of the spectrum, in Stastny v. Southern Bell Telephone
& Telegraph Co. ,14 the Fourth Circuit stated emphatically that Rodriguez
rejected the basis for the across-the-board theory, namely that such ac-
tions are by their very nature class actions." Earlier in Hill v. Western
Electric Co.,76 this same circuit said that
[a]ll blacks and females have an interest in being free from
discrimination in employment. In a very broad and loose sense,
any member of any such class who suffers discrimination has
the same interest as other members of the class who suffered
discrimination in very different circumstances and by very dif-
ferent means, but clearly that is not the thrust of Rodriquez
[sic]. The interest of these named, employed plaintiffs in being
free of discrimination in job assignments and in promotions is
so different in kind from that of people who were denied any
73. 626 F.2d at 375.
74. Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980).
75. Id. at 273 n.7 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). The court required substantial proof on the merits
of the allegations of a pattern or practice of discrimination. It assumed that the inquiry
into commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation is inextricably intertwined
with an inquiry into the merits. The court found that a pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion must be proven under either the disparate impact or disparate treatment theories,
and must affect all class members "in substantially, if not completely, comparable ways."
628 F.2d at 273. Therefore, such pattern or practice must be shown to exist before
a claim can be certified. See infra text accompanying notes 162-73 for a discussion of
proof at the class certification hearing.
76. Hill v. Western Electric Co., 596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1979).
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employment that the named plaintiffs may not properly main-
tain an action for redress of alleged discrimination in hiring.
77
The restrictive certification proponents presume that discrimination
is a discreet and isolated occurrence, while the across-the-board proponents
of liberal certification believe that "[wihere the common thread of
discrimination is alleged to weave through the defendant's employment
practices, the varying ways in which the alleged discriminatory policy
affects different class members, if at all, should not preclude class
certification."
7 8
E. General Telephone Co. v. Falcon
The Supreme Court, however, did not endorse the view of the pro-
ponents of liberal certification. In early 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit in General Telephone Co. v. Falcon. 79 In its rever-
sal of Falcon, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of "same in-
terest, same injury." 80
In Falcon, the district court certified a class of all Mexican-American
employees and applicants for employment. Falcon's individual complaint
was that he had not received a promotion while less qualified whites
had. Following the trial, the district court decided that Falcon had not
been discriminated against when he was hired, but that the company
had discriminated against him in its promotion practices. With regard
to the class, the district court found that the company did not discriminate
classwide in promotion practices, but that it did discriminate in its hir-
ing practices. 81 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the class certification based
on its conviction that across-the-board actions were proper. 82 The Supreme
77. Id. at 101-02.
78. Jordan v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982),
vacated, 459 U.S. 810 (1982). The Ninth Circuit also continued to apply across-the-
board certification and allowed the requirements of Rule 23(a) to be liberally applied.
79. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
80. East Texas Motor Freight System v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977).
81. Falcon v. General Tel. Co., 463 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd in
part, 626 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
82. In its decision, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the individual relief but held the
district court's finding insufficient to support class relief. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court vacated the judgment. It based its decision on Texas Dept. of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The Fifth Circuit then vacated the portion of its opin-
ion regarding individual liability and remanded to the district court. At this point, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 457 U.S. at 154-55.
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Court disagreed with the proposition underlying the across-the-board rule,
that racial discrimination is by definition class discrimination; it stated that
there is a wide gap between (a) an individual's claim that he
has been denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds and
his otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a
policy of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a class of per-
sons who have suffered the same injury as that individual, such
- that the individual's claim and the class claims will share com-
mon questions of law or fact and that the individual's claim
will be typical of the class claims.8 3
The Court said the gap could be bridged by showing not only the
validity of the plaintiff's claim, but also
(1) that this discriminatory treatment is typical of [defendant's]
promotion practices, (2) that [defendant's] promotion practices
are motivated by a policy of ethnic discrimination that pervades
[one of defendant's divisions] or (3) that this policy of ethnic
discrimination is reflected in [defendant's] other employment
practices, such as hiring, in the same way it is manifested in
the promotion practices.
84
The plaintiff had failed to bridge the gap. Instead the Court said he
adduced proof of intentional discrimination with regard to his own claim
and statistical evidence to indicate disparate impact with regard to the
class.8 5 The Court finally said that the district court erred when it failed
to evaluate whether the plaintiff was a proper class representative. The
Court reiterated that all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) must be satisfied.
It then remanded for that determination.
86
The Court in Falcon clearly indicated that even though racial
discrimination is by definition class discrimination, discrimination alone
83. 457 U.S. at 157 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 158.
85. Id. at 157-59. See infra text accompanying notes 247-48. See also Strickler,
supra note 27, at 132 n.302. Professor Strickler points out that the plaintiff in Falcon
used statistics to prove the class discrimination. Statistics are equally useful in proving
both disparate impact and disparate treatment claims. Since Falcon was not attacking
a neutral employment practice, Professor Strickler's conclusion is that the class claim
was a disparate treatment claim as well.
If the individual and class claims had to be proved using only anecdotal evidence,
disparate treatment class actions would be impossible.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 98 and 99 for subsequent case history.
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no longer supplies the common question of law or fact, nor does tlhe
plaintiff's allegation of discrimination meet the typicality requirement.
87
Furthermore, the court may not single out employment discrimination
actions for favored treatment under Rule 23.88
Nevertheless, the Court did not say that Title VII class actions were
to be subjected to greater scrutiny. It also left an important window
open for broad-based class actions in footnote 15. In that footnote, the
Court, by way of example only, said that the plaintiff could represnt
others complaining of different practices if the employer used a biased
testing procedure to evaluate applicants for hire and promotion, or if
it operated under a general policy of discrimination, such as subjective
decision making, which manifested itself in the same way in hiring and
promotion. 89
After Falcon, some lower courts continued to use the across-the-board
analysis for a time, but even the Fifth Circuit finally found that liberal
across-the-board certification was no longer viable. 90
F. Post Rodriguez-Falcon Interpretation of Rule 23 Requirements Generally
Although some courts had already interpreted Rodriguez to prohibit
across-the-board class actions, 9' the effect of Falcon was much more pro-
87. 457 U.S. at 157.
88. Id. at 161. Another significant case intervened between Rodriguez and
Falcon, General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980). In that case, the Supreme
Court held that the EEOC did not have to comply with the requirements of Rule 23.
"When the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals,
it acts also to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination."
446 U.S. at 326. Some commentators believe that this decision underlies the Court's
decision in Falcon since the private litigants no longer need latitude to act in the public
interest. Anderson, supra note 36, at 919-20. This reasoning appears to be sound. The
Supreme Court cited General Tel. Co. v. EEOC for the proposition that while the EEOC
does not have to comply with Rule 23, Title VII suits must meet the prerequisites of
Rule 23 since Title VII contains no special authorization for class suits by private per-
sons. 457 U.S. at 156.
89. 457 U.S. at 159 n.15. Footnote 15, as will be discussed infra (text accompa-
nying notes 121-37), if properly interpreted can be utilized to continue broad-based class
actions in many situations.
90. See infra note 93.
91. See, e.g., Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 273 n.7
(4th Cir. 1980); Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 581 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1978).
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nounced. 92 The change in philosophy was nowhere more profound than
in the Fifth Circuit which had originated the across-the-board theory.
In Wilkins v. University of Houston,93 the Fifth Circuit admitted that Falcon
and another recent case 94 tilted
the decisional calculus . . . against the individual plaintiffs and
the plaintiff class .... Falcon tightens the requirements for class
certification in Title VII cases such as this, reversing our own
decision in Falcon and casting cold water on the former liberal
application of our 'across-the-board' rule by enjoining careful
attention to the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, in Title VII cases.
95
In Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank, 96 the Fifth Circuit applied the
narrowest possible view of Falcon. In that case, one of the named plain-
tiffs (Vuyanich) was a black female who alleged, inter alia, discharge
from her job because she was married to a white male. The other named
plaintiff (Johnson) was an unsuccessful applicant for a management trainee
position. After a trial on the merits, the court found liability for some
of the subclasses. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the propriety of the class
certification based on Falcon and found that the two named plaintiffs
had been permitted to assert claims that were neither common nor typical
of their individual claims. According to the court, the trial court should
have limited Vuyanich's claims to race discrimination in termination
92. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1985), aff'd,
107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987); Jordan v. County of Los Angeles, 726 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.
1984); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1983).
93. Wilkins v. University of Houston, 695 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1983).
94. The other case was Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982). In
that case the Court disapproved the standard of review applied by the Fifth Circuit
in discrimination cases. The Fifth Circuit had distinguished between ultimate and sub-
sidiary facts. It defined a finding of discrimination vel non to be an ultimate fact which
the court could review outside of the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 53(A). The
Fifth Circuit had used this mechanism to reverse findings of no discrimination by lower
courts.
95. 695 F.2d at 135 (footnote omitted).
96. Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1073 (1984). The district court certified several subclasses of black and female
past and present employees as well as unsuccessful applicants. It also allowed intervenors
to represent some of the subclasses. After a trial on the merits, liability was found as
to some of the subclasses.
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
as a non-exempt employee and Johnson's claims to sex discrimination
in hiring exempt employees.
The Fifth Circuit had reversed its position, from allowing a class
representative to represent anyone to allowing a representative to repre-
sent only those in his or her exact situation. The effect of this type of
decision was to curtail severely the utility of Rule 23 in employment
actions.97 Few employers are large enough to discriminate within their
employment practices against enough people, within six months, to satisfy
the numerosity requirements of 23(a).
The remand of Falcon to the district court followed the Vuyanich case.
The trial court noted that the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Falcon,
and the Fifth Circuit's interpretation thereof, indicated that class cer-
tifications in employment discrimination cases would be "drastically cur-
tailed. '"98 Thus, the district court refused to allow Falcon to represent
the class. 99
III. ANALYSIS
Although a superficial analysis would indicate that class certifica-
tions must be virtually eliminated, this does not necessarily follow. Some
courts, including the Supreme Court in Falcon, 100 do not assign separate
meanings to the typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representa-
tion requirements of Rule 23(a). 10 1 It is clear, however, that if these
97. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 800-01 (5th Cir.
1986) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 3227 (1987).
98. Falcon v. General Tel. Co., 611 F. Supp. 707, 718 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
99. Id. at 717-18. The court, however, did give class members a chance to in-
tervene, although it noted that in any but this case intervention would be improper
under the newly developed law of the Circuit. Id. at 718-20.
100. The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to
merge. Both serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular
circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the
named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the in-
terests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their
absence. Those requirements therefore also tend to merge with the adequacy-
of-representation requirement, although the latter requirement also raises con-
cerns about the competency of class counsel and conflicts of interest.
General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58 n.13 (1982).
101. See, e.g., Kraszewski v. State Farm Ins. Co., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1352, 1353 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (adequacy of representation equated with commonality
and typicality).
[Vol. 19:1
1987] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS 25
requirements necessitate that all class members have virtually identical
claims, lack of numerosity will dispose of the class certification ques-
tion. 102 This result serves the goals of neither Title VII nor Rule 23.
At this point the article will review specifically how the courts are
dealing with the requirements of Rule 23 after Falcon "cast cold water"
10 3
on across-the-board certifications. It will then explore alternative ap-
proaches which allow Title VII class actions to continue and satisfy the
policies of both Rule 23 and of Title VII.
A. The Requirements of Commonality and Typicality: How Courts
are Dealing with These Requirements and How They Should Be Dealing
With Them
1. Rationale of Commonality and Typicality and Relationship to
Adequacy of Representation
The principal concern of Rule 23 is to assure that the class is ade-
quately represented. 104 Although Rule 23(a)(4)105 specifically requires that
the representation be adequate, the Rule 23(a)(3) requirement that the
claims of the representative be typical of the class claims is an essential
concomitant of adequate representation. 10 6 Similarly, the requirement
of common questions of law or fact is so closely related to typicality,
that it, too, is essential to the analysis of adequate representation.
The core of the conflict between the proponents of liberal and restric-
tive certification lies in how closely the plaintiff's claim must be related
to claims of the class in order to assure adequate representation. It is
appropriate, then, to begin with Rule 23(a)(3), typicality, about which
much confusion exists.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 213-17.
103. Wilkins v. University of Houston, 695 F.2d 134, 135 (5th Cir. 1983).
104. See supra text accompanying note 23.
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
The requirement of typical claims, while somewhat ill defined, seems intended
to reinforce the adequacy requirement by ensuring that the named plaintiffs'
interests are sufficiently aligned with those of class members to assure that
they not only can but will press each such claim to a full and equal extent.
Wofford v. Safeway Stores, 78 F.R.D. 460, 475 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See also Firefighters
Local 1590 v. City of Wilmington, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1073 (D. Del.
1985) (Only after a determination of typicality and commonality does the court reach
the question of adequacy of representation.).
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The rationale behind typicality is that if the plaintiff's claims are
typical, then he or she has the impetus provided by self-interest to ad-
vance the class claims along with his or her own.10 7 This does not mean,
however, that the claims of the class representative and the class must
be identical. As one court has stated,
the class should be limited to those employees whose interests
the named plaintiff is likely to press with substantially equal
vigor and ability. Any other interpretation could permit a
well-intentioned plaintiff, who could ably represent a limited
class, to bind a broad class of employees whose real interests
he may have misinterpreted or unconsciously subordinated to
his own, to a losing judgment or an unfavorable settlement.
10 8
Defendants have, however, argued for a more restrictive reading of
typicality to serve a divide and conquer strategy. Such an approach
is equally inconsistent with the policies of Title VII and Rule
23. Defendant invites the Court to find as a matter of law that
a class can only include those other persons of the same minor-
ity group, holding the same type of job, working in the same
facility, members of the same union local, and presenting the
same type of claim as a named plaintiff. Using these criteria
to narrow the proposed class to a small subclass for each in-
dividual plaintiff, defendant concludes that there are substantial
questions as to numerosity. This approach would of course soon
reduce Rule 23 to a nullity. 0 9
107. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940) (In order to be an adequate
representative, the plaintiff must be united in interest with, and be a member of, the
class.).
108. Wofford, 78 F.R.D. at 474. The Court also said that "[g]iven the subtle in-
fluence the representative plaintiff's viewpoint may have in shifting the focus of discovery
and trial preparation, it is doubtful that a court could compensate for this effect even
at trial." Id.
109. Id. at 474-75. Although it is an essential concommitant of representation,
typicality is a separate requirement embodied in Rule 23(a)(2). By the time adequacy
of representation under Rule 23(aX4) is considered, typicality should have been met,
so it is unnecessary that typicality be considerd again in Rule 23(a)(4). See Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded, 417
U.S. 156 (1974) (on other grounds). See supra text accompanying notes 31-35 regarding
overlap between Rule 23(a)(3) and (4).
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Typicality is closely related to whether common questions of law
or fact exist. If the court decides that the plaintiffs claims are typical
of those of the class, then inherent in this is the finding that there are
questions of law or fact common to the class. The two requirements,
however, proceed from different perspectives. 110 Common questions of
law or fact define the claims of the class, while typicality relates the claims
of the representative to those common questions."1
2. Analysis of Commonality and Typicality Requirements in
Rodriguez and Falcon
The across-the-board theory oversimplified these issues by declar-
ing that the common question is discrimination, and that the plaintiffs
claim is typical if he is alleging discrimination. Rodriguez cast doubt on
this analysis. Falcon obliterated it.112 The courts after Falcon are not in
agreement but many are using the commonality and typicality re-
quirements to deny certification if the claim of the plaintiff is not vir-
tually identical to the claims of the class.11
3
In Rodriguez, the Court said that the named plaintiffs were not
members of the class, because they did not possess the same interest
or suffer the same injury."14 If the Court meant this to be an additional
requirement to Rule 23(a), it rendered Rules 23(a)(2) and (3) superfluous.
Commonality should define the interest and injury of the class, while
typicality should define the interest and injury of the class representative.
Commonality and typicality are both in turn necessary to adequate
representation in the broad sense.1 1 5
110. 1 H. NEWBERT, NEWBERG ON CLAss AcTiONS S 3.13, at 164 (2d ed. 1985).
111. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 23, at § 164; 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note
110, at § 3.13 at 164.
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that some questions of law or fact be common, not that
all questions of law and fact be shared among class members. In fact, commonality can
be satisfied if a single question of law or fact exists. The "Damoclean threat" of racial
discrimination, Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966),
is a common question of law or fact, but, unlike in the past, it is no longer enough
to meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).
112. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-58 (1982).
113. See, e.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984).
114. East Texas Motor Freight System v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977).
115. See supra note 106 and text accompanying notes 31-34.
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The Rodriguez holding can, however, be interpreted differently. In
Rodriguez, the named plaintiffs were not objectively qualified for the jobs
they sought, nor were they discriminated against otherwise. Having suf-
fered no injury at all they had no standing to raise claims 1 6 for those
who had been injured. Thus, it can be argued that the Rodriguez plain-
tiffs failed on Rule 23's introductory requirement that "one or more
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties .... "11I7
The plaintiff who has suffered no injury at all, as in Rodriguez, should
be contrasted with the plaintiff who has suffered an injury which is atypical
of the interest and injury of the class members. While it is true that
the Court in Rodriguez used interest and injury in the context of whether
the plaintiff has standing to sue, the precise analysis used in the case
is appropriate only in cases such as Rodriguez in which the plaintiff has
not been injured at all. The commonality and typicality requirements
of Rule 23 are irrelevant in such a case, since they ensure that the plain-
tiff's interest and injury are typical of the class once the interest and
injury of the plaintiff are ascertained."1
8
116. See supra note 36.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (emphasis added).
118. See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420, 426-30 (N.D. Tex.
1979) (A court should determine first whether the plaintiff has standing to assert his
or her individual claim. Whether he or she can represent the class is then determined
by Rule 23.); Abron v. Black & Decker (U.S.), 654 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981) (Mur-
naghan, J., dissenting) (Loss of benefits from interracial association is alone sufficient
to confer standing as is the right to work in an atmosphere free of discrimination.);
Hansen v. Webster, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 214, 223-24 (D.D.C. 1986) (The
plaintiff's success in overcoming discrimination did "not disqualify her from serving
as a class agent provided there [was] 'significant proof that an employer operated under
a policy of discrimination.' ").
It is difficult to reconcile Falcon with cases in which the plaintiffs retained standing
to represent a class, despite the fact that they had no live claim at all, if the Court
in Falcon intended to limit standing to persons injured by identical employment prac-
tices. See Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980); United States
Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). See Strickler, supra note 27, at 133-37.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Falcon's footnote 15 did not require a class
representative to allege injury in hiring to represent persons so injured as long as the
other requirements of Rule 23 were met. See Willborn, Personal Stake, Rule 23, and the
Employment Discrimination Class Action, 22 B.C.L. REv. 1 (1980); Bridgesmith, supra note
69, at 1426-28; Shawe, Processing the Explosion in Title VII Class Action Suits: Achieving
Increased Compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), 19 WM. & MARY L. REV.
469, 496-98 (1978).
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The Court in Falcon made it clear that the "same interest and in-
jury" test enunciated in Rodriguez generally would be met only by
employees complaining of the same employment practice. That is, com-
monality would be met by all employees complaining of discrimination
in promotion, and typicality by a class representative who alleged
discrimination in promotions. 1 9 The Court, however, left open the
possibility of broader based class actions in footnote 15:
If [the employer] used a biased testing procedure to evaluate
both applicants for employment and incumbent employees, a
class action on behalf of every applicant or employee who might
have been prejudiced by the test clearly would satisfy the com-
monality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). Significant
proof that an employer operated under a general policy of
discrimination conceivably could justify a class of both applicants
and employees if the discrimination manifested itself in hiring
and promotion practices in the same general fashion, such as
through entirely subjective decision-making processes. In this
regard it is noteworthy that Title VII prohibits discriminatory
employment practices, not an abstract policy of discrimination.
The mere fact that an aggrieved private plaintiff is a member
of an identifiable class of persons of the same race or national
origin is insufficient to establish his standing to litigate on their
behalf all possible claims of discrimination against a common
employer.1
20
3. Interpretations of Falcon's Footnote 15 in Broad-Based
Class Actions
The argument can be made that Falcon, in which Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined, was intended not to eliminate class actions altogether,
but to ensure that courts not apply the requirements of Rule 23 super-
ficially. Footnote 15, if properly applied, can serve as a vehicle to con-
tinue broad-based class certifications in legitimate cases. Indeed, although
some courts interpret footnote 15 narrowly, others have led the way in
interpreting it broadly.
119. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 (1982).
120. See Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1009 (1983). See generally Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, 798 F.2d 590, 597
(2d Cir. 1986).
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A look at some cases that used footnote 15 shows how it can be
interpreted. Some courts have avoided a restrictive outcome based on
the footnote by distinguishing Falcon altogether. The distinctions have
been based on the fact that the plaintiff in that case did not show that
the employment practices were interdependent.1 2' In cases distinguishing
Falcon, the plaintiffs have established a link among the employment prac-
tices, and, in addition, have shown subjective decisionmaking to be the
vehicle of the discrimination.
In one such case, Richardson v. Byrd, a sex discrimination case in-
volving a sheriff's department, the Fifth Circuit utilized footnote 15.122
It found a nexus between applicants and employees, because the sheriff
assigned all new female deputies to the jail and restricted their transfer
to more desirable areas. Since the female section of the jail was smaller
121. In a similar case, Johnson v. Montgomery County Sheriff's Dept., 99 F.R.D.
562 (M.D. Ala. 1983), the court found a connection between applicants and employees
based on a reciprocal relationship between hiring opportunities on the one hand, and
transfer and promotion opportunities on the other hand. This finding was based on
the fact that female applicants could not be hired unless vacancies occurred in jail posi-
tions held by women. Similarly female deputies could not move up and out of jail jobs
unless female applicants were hired. 99 F.R.D. at 565. These factual findings, in addi-
tion to findings of subjective decisionmaking, fulfilled footnote 15's requirements of com-
monality and typicality.
See also Kraszewski v. State Farm Ins. Co., 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1352
(N.D. Cal. 1982). In this case the plaintiffs sought to represent a class of applicants
and deterred applicants discriminated against on the basis of sex in recruitment, hiring,
and training. The district court upheld certification of the class and distinguished Falcon
on three grounds: 1) the suit involved one job position, that of a trainee agent, 2) the
types of evidence required to prove all class claims were interrelated so that the plaintiff
satisfied commonality and typicality, and 3) instead of alleging a "loose mix of discrimina-
tion in promotion and discrimination in hiring," plaintiffs alleged discrimination in three
"interrelated steps on the way to becoming a [trainee agent]." 36 Fair Empl. Prac.
Gas. (BNA) 1352, 1353. The court held that footnote 15 justified certifying a class of
applicants, deterred applicants, and employees based on plaintiffs' allegation of a general
policy of discrimination manifested in entirely subjective decisionmaking processes.
Similarly, in Brown v. Eckerd Drugs, 564 F. Supp. 1440 (W.D.N.C. 1983), the
district court said that the named plaintiffs' demotion and discharge claims and the
class's promotion and transfer claims presented sufficient common questions of law and
fact. Even though the injuries were different, the discrimination manifested itself in the
same fashion - through an entirely subjective decisionmaking process in the hands
of an overwhelmingly white management work force. 564 F. Supp. at 1446.
122. Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1009 (1983).
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than the male section, this difference limited the number of female
employees the department could employ, a practice which affected both
applicants and employees. In addition, the sheriff made decisions based
on subjective, rather than objective, factors, and this subjective deci-
sionmaking pervaded all practices. The Court said that the plaintiff in
Falcon had failed to provide a basis for the trial court's conclusion that
his promotion discrimination claim would involve questions of law or
fact common to hiring discrimination claims. The plaintiff in the Richardson
case, in contrast, showed that common questions of law or fact existed
in that the assignment practices and subjective decisionmaking affected
female employees and applicants.
In other cases, the courts have avoided a restrictive outcome by
using statistical evidence and showing that the vehicle for the discrimina-
tion was subjective decisionmaking. In Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State
University, for instance, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant unlawfully
channeled blacks and women into lower paying jobs through its hiring
and initial assignment policies. 123 The case was prosecuted as an across-
the-board class action on the basis that these policies were maintained
by discriminatory promotions, transfers, pay, termination, and retire-
ment programs. The defendant contended that the court erred in allow-
ing the plaintiffs, all former custodial workers, to represent clerical
employees. In response, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the crucial in-
quiry was whether adjudication of the class representatives' claim of chan-
neling into lower paying jobs involved issues of law or fact common
to clerical employees, who had also been channeled into similarly lower
paying jobs. The court said that statistical proof of channeling in both
classifications and anecdotal testimony of clerical employees satisfied foot-
note 15. The evidence set forth common issues of law or fact regarding
the defendant's subjective job assignments that resulted in channeling
of blacks and females into lower paying jobs.
Similarly, in Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, the Second Circuit inter-
preted the primary meaning of Falcon to be that the requirements of
Rule 23 may not be presumed. 124 In the Rossini case, the plaintiff had
been denied a transfer and sought to represent women who had been
denied transfers, promotions, and training. She attempted to show that
the defendant had limited opportunities for women in these practices
123. Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 617 (5th Cir. 1983).
124. Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, 798 F.2d 590, 597 (2d Cir. 1986).
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by using subjective evaluation systems and that the same central group
of people made such decisions. The court found that the requirements
of footnote 15 were met; the plaintiff should have been allowed to repre-
sent the class of persons described, since the defendant discriminated
against the entire class in the same general fashion.
These cases show reliance by courts on footnote 15 to allow represen-
tation by plaintiffs harmed in a way typical of, but not identical with,
the harm suffered by other class members, despite the Falcon outcome.
Thus, more than a vestige of liberal certification survives. Courts can
apply footnote 15 in a common sense way that accommodate both the
policy and requirements of Rule 23 and of Title VII.
In contrast, courts which ignore this possibility and apply the re-
quirements of Rule 23(a) in an excessively restrictive fashion defeat the
policy of Title VII and the remedial purposes of Rule 23. The defen-
dants litigating in such courts are aware that they can defeat class ac-
tions by focusing on the differences between named plaintiffs and the
class. By requiring such an identical interest between plaintiffs and the
class, no class can be certified, because it will always fail for lack of
numerosity.
In a compelling dissent to a pre-Falcon reversal of class certification,
Judge Murnaghan of the Fourth Circuit observed:
Should Title VII suits ever come into general judicial disfavor,
no doubt defendants will be quick to emphasize even trivial
dissimilarities. By focusing on the slightest factual variations of,
or the particular label attached to, each area of management
decision, the majority's theory of 'same interest, same injury'
can be applied to reduce all employment discrimination classes
into a class of one.
125
125. See, e.g., Abron v. Black & Decker (U.S.), 654 F.2d 951, 961 (4th Cir. 1981)
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting). In Abron "[p]roof at trial exposed an extensive, plant-wide
pattern of discrimination . . . " Out of 2500 employees, thirteen percent were black,
despite the fact that twenty-two percent of the experienced labor force in the area was
black. There was a clear picture of discriminatory hiring. Discriminatory job assign-
ment and promotion were also shown. In short, there was "[aln extensive, cohesive
pattern of racially discriminatory employment practices ...." Id. at 956-57 (Mumaghan,
J., dissenting). Even so, the Court of Appeals held in a per curiam opinion that, since
the plaintiff had suffered no injury other than denial of temporary transfer to light work,
she had not suffered the same injury as the class she purported to represent.
As the dissent points out, "[rlule 23 and Title VII direct courts to focus on the
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This prediction came true as many courts after Rodriguez and Falcon
accepted the arguments of the proponents of the divide-and-conquer theory
that claims of the class representative must be identical to those of the
class. As discussed earlier, 2 6 the Fifth Circuit also interpreted Falcon in
Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank of Dallas.1 27 In Vuyanich the court of
appeals held that footnote 15 did not apply, because there was not a
sufficient showing of a pattern or practice of discrimination. 1 28 Thus,
the two plaintiffs did not satisfy commonality and typicality, the court
said, and Vuyanich's claims should have been limited to race discrimina-
tion in termination of non-exempt employees while Johnson's claim should
have been limited to sex discrimination in hiring exempt employees. Since
the two plaintiffs could only allege injury based on hiring and termina-
tion, they did not have standing to assert class claims arising from other
employment practices.
The decision in Vuyanich is an example of overly restrictive inter-
pretation of footnote 15. The lower court had found that there was suffi-
cient statistical evidence to conclude that common questions existed in
the form of discriminatory animus cutting across a number of different
practices. With regard to typicality, the district court in Vuyanich said
that typicality does not require identical harm resulting from the same
type of practice. The practices attacked were hiring, promotion, pay,
training, testing, transfer, job assignment and classification, job content,
and constructive discharge. The court created a subclass of applicants.
It noted that the plaintiff and intervenor contended they were personally
injured by most of the other practices, all of which were intertwined.
"A denial of training, for example, will affect promotion; testing may
affect transfer; a variety of discriminatory practices may drive a person
to resign."' 2 9 It is clear that the lower court did not abuse its discretion.
common interests and common claims that a class as a whole desires to vindicate. Never-
theless, the majority focuses instead on the purportedly distinctive manifestations of the
common pattern and practice of race discrimination." Id. at 957.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
127. Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1073 (1984).
128. 723 F.2d at 1199-1200. See supra text accompanying note 96. In cases alleg-
ing a pattern or practice of discrimination, the plaintiff must prove that the discriminatory
practice is the employer's standard operating procedure. See B. SCIILEx & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note 10, at 1288-89.
129. Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420, 433 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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Its finding of a pattern and practice of discrimination, in addition to
subjective decisionmaking, should have been enough to satisfy footnote 15.
In general, in narrow class actions, if a named plaintiff's claims
relate to the same employment practices as the claims of the class, Falcon
itself teaches that commonality and typicality can be met.13 0 The prob-
lem identified by Falcon arises when the plaintiff must meet commonali-
ty and typicality requirements in cases where he or she wishes to repre-
sent persons injured by employment practices different from the ones
which allegedly injured him or her. In these broader-based class actions,
commonality and typicality may still be met following footnote 15 if some
common question - other than discrimination in the broad sense -
cuts across the practices alleged. The Falcon Court gave the example
of a testing procedure used for hiring and promotion which affects a
protected group disparately. Where such a testing procedure is alleged,
the common question would be whether the test is discriminatory. The
plaintiff's claim would be typical if he or she alleged injury based on
the biased testing procedure.
In cases where a circumscribed practice, such as a biased testing
procedure, is involved, the Falcon Court did not require proof of
discrimination. Where a more nebulous vehicle for discrimination is
alleged, however, such as subjective decisionmaking in general, the Court
required significant proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination. Thus,
in order to satisfy commonality, the plaintiff must show by statistical
evidence or significant anecdotal evidence that widespread discrimina-
tion exists and that a vehicle, such as subjective decisionmaking, exists
for that discrimination. Typicality would be satisfied by the plaintiffs
allegation of injury based on the subjective decisionmaking.
13
1
The vehicle for discrimination will generally relate to how the
employer makes decisions. Decisionmaking can be based on subjective
factors, such as attitude and appearance, objective factors, such as a
typing test, or a combination of both. If evidence of a pattern or prac-
tice of discrimination can be shown,1 3 2 if the decisionmaking in question
130. See infra text accompanying notes 145-57 regarding other obstacles, such as
different jobs, to satisfying commonality and typicality.
131. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982). See infra text
accompanying notes 162-73 for a discussion of proof on the merits.
132. Several courts have decided that footnote 15 is satisfied if the employment
practices are linked in some way, and there is subjective decisionmaking. See supra text
accompanying notes 121-22.
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is entirely subjective, and if the plaintiff and the class have also been
injured by such decisionmaking, then footnote 15 is satisfied. Similarly,
if objective decisionmaking has caused the discrimination, then the specific
objective criterion, such as a written test, should be identified. Accord-
ingly, the class should be limited to members who have been injured
by the test. Obviously, this showing fulfills the requirements of footnote
15; the plaintiff has shown a pattern or practice of discrimination. That
footnote 15 would be met in such a case is indicated by the Falcon Court's
specific example of the biased test.
The problem arises usually in the case in which decisionmaking com-
bines objective and subjective factors. In the Vuyanich case, the Fifth
Circuit said that the fact that the defendant relied on two objective criteria
- education and experience - in its "necessarily subjective hiring prac-
tices" precluded reliance on footnote 15. i13 This is an unnecessarily grudg-
ing interpretation of footnote 15.
While footnote 15 addresses situations involving entirely subjective
or objective decisionmaking, nevertheless, when the plaintiff and the class
are alleging injury based on decisionmaking which combines both sub-
jective and objective factors the fact that no particular factor emerges
as the culprit should not bar the class action.
134
Similarly, if all of the class is alleging injury based on subjective
decisionmaking, the fact that the employer uses objective factors for some
employment decisions and not for others should not bar the class action,
since subjective decisionmaking is itself a common question of fact. The
key in these situations, as in the case of entirely subjective decisionmak-
ing, is whether an inference of a pattern or practice of discrimination
can be drawn. If so, the defendant should be required to explain it,
not the plaintiff. Thus, the requirements of footnote 15 should be met
133. Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1073 (1984).
134. In the usual case, the employer uses both objective and subjective factors;
however, he or she may apply the objective factors in a subjective manner to make
the ultimate decision. For example, the employer may use subjective criteria, such as
attitude and appearance, and also require prior work experience, which is objective.
However, the final decision is based on an overall evaluation of all three criteria. If
the class and the plaintiff can show they were discriminated against based on the overall
subjective evaluation, class treatment is appropriate. Those members of the class who
have no prior work experience have not been injured by subjective decisionmaking and
should be excluded. See, e.g., Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476 (11th Cir. 1987).
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
in most situations, as long as the Court can draw the requisite inference
of a pattern or practice of discrimination.
13
1
Not all courts agree with this analysis. For example, in Lilly v. Harris-
Teeter Supermarkets, the court said that as to commonality the complaint
contained allegations of disparate treatment in the exercise of unbridled
discretion by the white supervisory workforce. 136 The question was,
however, whether the named plaintiff's claims of discriminatory termina-
tion and retaliation were typical of the unpromoted employee's claims.
The court said that the proof overlapped on several important points:
the absence of written objective criteria for promotions and terminations,
the absence of regular job evaluations, and the overwhelmingly white
supervisory workforce. The court found, however, that some issues in-
volved in promotion raised significant issues of proof separate from the
termination claim. The defendant allegedly limited supervisory discre-
tion by giving substantial weight to prior work experience, an objective
criterion, and treating blacks and whites differently in terms of utilizing
this information. In addition, the defendant limited supervisory discre-
tion in promotion decisions by using a "same department/same shift"
policy allegedly enforced only against blacks. Thus, the court decided
that the named plaintiff's claim was not typical of the claims of the class.
This result is incorrect in that Rule 23(a)(3) requires only that some
questions of law or fact be common, while Rule 23(a)(2) requires only
that the named plaintiff's claim be typical, not identical. Furthermore,
footnote 15 allows a plaintiff suffering from discrimination in one employ-
ment practice to represent a class suffering from discrimination in other
practices if significant proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination
which manifests itself in the "same general fashion" is shown. Since
the supervisory workforce was overwhelmingly white, and decisionmak-
ing was almost totally subjective, these facts should have been enough
to allow the plaintiff to represent persons who were not promoted. In
any event, although the employer utilized objective criteria, the criteria
were applied subjectively. Apparently the Fourth Circuit took the Supreme
135. See infra text accompanying notes 162-73.
136. Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 333-34 (4th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984). The named plaintiff had alleged discriminatory ter-
mination and retaliation and sought to represent a class of persons discriminated against
in hiring, promotion, interviewing, termination, supervision, and discipline. In support
of the motion, the plaintiff presented statistical evidence purporting to show disparities
and cited specific examples of discrimination. Twenty personsintervened and, together
with the named plaintiff, were allowed to represent the class. Id. at 329.
[Vol. 19:1
19871 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS 37
Court's example in footnote 15 literally, as applying only to entirely
subjective decisionmaking processes. Alternatively, the Circuit interpreted
footnote 15 as requiring that all questions of fact be common and that
the named plaintiff's claim be typical of all such claims.
3 7
4. Interpretations of Falcon Not Involving Footnote 15
After Rodriguez and Falcon, there has been a marked tendency in
those courts which do not use footnote 15 to follow the divide-and-conquer
rationale to defeat class certification. Some courts have even said that
typicality and commonality are frequently lacking in disparate treatment
cases, thus eliminating the most common theory of discrimination.1
38
These courts consider disparate treatment to be so individualized that
class treatment is frequently inappropriate.
In a typical situation, the plaintiff was an assistant manager; the
court did not allow him to represent non-management employees. The
court, however, also held that even if the class were narrowed to include
only assistant managers, the plaintiff's claims were too individualized to
meet the typicality requirement. Since he was complaining of incidents
which occurred at several different stores, the plaintiff's claims would
be subject to unique defenses.
39
Similarly, in Batesville Casket Co. EEO Litigation, the plaintiff asserted
that the company segregated its sales territory, and that the segregation
affected all of its eleven black sales representatives throughout the coun-
try. 14 0 The court said that since many of the facts to be developed would
clearly relate to individual performances, typicality and commonality re-
quirements were not met.'
4
1
137. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982).
138. See, e.g., Lucky v. Board of Regents, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 986
(S.D. Fla. 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 242-45 for an explanation of disparate
treatment.
139. Gray v. Walgreen Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 835 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
140. 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1560, 1563 (D.D.C. 1984).
141. See Merrill v. Southern Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1986) (In
an academic setting, commonality and typicality are difficult to find, and denial of tenure
turns on unique facts; therefore, the plaintiff's class action would have "[q]uickly
disintegrated into a plethora of individual claims." 806 F.2d at 608.). See also Hall v.
American Bosch Div., 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 853 (D. Mass. 1986); Berggren
v. Sunbeam Corp., 108 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Gray v. Walgreen Co., 33 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 835 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Moses v. Avco Corp., 97 F.R.D. 20
(D. Conn. 1982); Patterson v. General Motors, 631 F.2d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1980) (because
plaintiff's claims are so personal, it is predictable that a major focus of the litigation
will be defenses unique to the plaintiff), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 914 (1980).
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These courts ignore the reality of the employment situation. "[T]he
named plaintiffs' claims will always have the initial appearance of in-
dividualized grievances. But that does not preclude the maintenance of
a class action . . . . If broadbased discrimination is in fact proved at
trial on the merits, the individual considerations will be handled in the
subsequent phase of the proceedings."
1 4 2
In contrast, several courts have recognized that employee grievances
will necessarily appear to be individualized. 1 3 For example, one court
opined that neither typicality nor commonality was vitiated when
"discriminatory promotion procedures . . .affect individual employees
in different ways, because of their diverse qualifications and ambitions.
These factual variations are not sufficient to deny class treatment to the




Employers also argue that different or unique jobs should preclude
certification. In Meyer v. MacMillan Publishing Co., the defendant argued
that the jobs performed by the plaintiffs were essentially unique, and
thus that commonality and typicality were lacking. 4 5 The court disagreed,
saying that if this barred the plaintiffs from being class representatives,
no class of professional employees could ever be certified. Furthermore,
affidavits indicated that clerical employees shared the same grievances,
In Moses, the court found that the plaintiffs had met the commonality requirement
by submitting statistics on minority employment and affidavits alleging specific
discriminatory practices regarding hiring, promotion, termination, seniority, layoff, recall,
job placement, and transfers. 97 F.R.D. at 23. However, the plaintiffs alleged grievances
were too particularized and individualized to be typical of class claims. Id. at 24.
142. Wofford v. Safeway Stores, 78 F.R.D. 460, 479 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
143. In Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1984), the Fourth Cir-
cuit refused to accept the employer's contention that harassment and retaliation claims
are not susceptible to class treatment, because they are too individualized. Even though
there were individual fact questions, the plaintiffs had established a pattern of retalia-
tion, which was a common question of law sufficient to satisfy commonality. Id. at 217.
144. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 562, 582 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (quoting Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 561 (8th Cir. 1982)). See
Wester v. Special School District No. 1, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 199, 202
(D. Minn. 1984). The response to the contention that claims are too individualized
is that a court can use a combination of anecdotal and statistical proof to illuminate
the issues without separately examining each class member. Huguley v. General Motors,
638 F. Supp. 1301, 1303-04 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
145. Meyer v. Macmillan Publishing Co., 95 F.R.D. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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and since movement from one classification to another was not uncom-
mon, commonality and typicality would be satisfied in this regard as
well. 1
46
If the plaintiff presents evidence that a discriminatory policy exists
in certain job classifications, then this evidence presents questions of fact
common to all employees in the protected class regardless of differences
among jobs. 14 7 The courts, however, do not uniformly hold this view.
In fact, some courts are likely to consider different job classifications
as automatically precluding commonality and typicality. 4  For exam-
ple, in Sobel v. Yeshiva University, the plaintiffs were not allowed to repre-
sent all female professors holding either an M.D. or Ph.D. 149 The court
considered commonality and typicality to be lacking because M.D.s were
paid more than Ph.D.s, and because M.D.s taught clinical courses while
Ph.D.s taught theoretical courses. 150 The court reached this conclusion
even though it admits that sex discrimination may manifest itself in the
same way in the two classes.
51
In Cook v. Boorstin, the district court found that the plaintiffs lacked
typicality under Falcon to represent all professionals because they were
not qualified for all professional positions. 5 2 The court of appeals reversed
on the ground that the district court had improperly denied a motion
to intervene. 5 3 The court suggested, however, that the lower court had
applied an overly restrictive view of the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), and
that the case might best go forward as a class action. In the appellate
court's view, the plaintiffs had met the typicality requirement by pre-
senting affidavits and memoranda suggesting that the employer's sub-
146. Id. at 413-14.
147. See American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Washington,
578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983), rev'd, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
148. See, e.g., Sperling v. Donovan, 104 F.R.D. 4, 6-7 (D.D.C. 1984); Plater
v. Boyle, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1223, 1224-25 (D.D.C. 1978); Wofford v.
Safeway Stores, 78 F.R.D. 460, 484-85 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Lightfoot v. Gallo Sales Co.,
15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 615, 620 (N.D. Cal. 1977). See B. SCHLE3 & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note 10, at 283 ("The trend is to deny certification of a class containing several
distinct job classifications .... ").
149. Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 85 F.R.D. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
150. Id. at 323-24.
151. Id. at 325.
152. Cook v. Boorstin, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1771 (D.D.C. 1983).
153. Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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jective standards had resulted in systemic discrimination against blacks
and other minorities. The appellate court felt that this presumption was
sufficient under footnote 15 of Falcon.154 As the court aptly said, "[i]f
our nation is to move with speed toward genuine equality of opportuni-
ty, employers . . . cannot be allowed to escape the requirements of Title
VII by a litigation strategy of divide and conquer.' '155
Courts also have held that, even when there is a statistical showing
of underrepresentation, if centralized personnel departments do not make
the decisions, commonality and typicality are lacking. 156 This analysis
is incorrect. If a company-wide pattern of discrimination is evidenced,
then, regardless of the proof of decentralized decisionmaking, the employer
should bear the burden of explaining the disparity and should not be
excused from doing so by capitalizing on a technical separation of func-
tions. 157
In Coates v. Johnson &Johnson, the court summaried the opposing
views held by employees and employers in Title VII litigation.1 58
It has often been observed that individual instances of racial
discrimination, by definition, frequently reflect a pattern or policy
154. Id. at 1471-72.
155. Id. at 1472. In Wester v. Special School District No. 1, 35 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 199 (D. Minn. 1984), the plaintiffs were rejected for assistant principal
positions. They were attempting to represent all past and future women and American
Indian applicants for administrative positions. The defendant argued that the selection
methodology for other certified positions varied and that common questions were lack-
ing. The court said that the commonality requirement "does not require that every
question of law or fact be common"; "class certification is not defeated due to the vary-
ing qualifications and ambitions of the individual class members." Id. at 203.
156. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 163 (1983) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199,
216 (4th Cir. 1984); Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 668-70 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'd
in part, vacated in part, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986). See generally Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 798 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 3227 (1987).
157. See Wofford v. Safeway Stores, 78 F.R.D. 460, 479 (N.D. Cal. 1978). In
Kuenz v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 104 F.R.D. 474 (E.D. Mo. 1985), such con-
tentions were overcome in a sex discrimination case by a showing that national person-
nel were responsible for implementing local personnel policies which were "largely sub-
jective and therefore dependent on decisions from an all-male hierarchy." Id. at 477.
Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had never employed a woman
at a level higher than store manager. Id. at 476.
158. Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 421 (N.D.
Ill. 1981).
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affecting more than just a given individual victim .... The
employee thus focuses on the general policies of the employer,
as evidenced by how similarly situated employees have been
treated.
Employers, on the other hand, contending that they do not
unlawfully discriminate, suggest that any given instance of dif-
ferential treatment can be explained and must be viewed based
on its particular, allegedly unique, circumstances. 15 9
Courts are tending to adopt the employer's view over the previously-
accepted employee's view. This conclusion is not unreasonable considering
that Title VII has been the law for more than twenty years. When a
court is presented with statistical or anecdotal evidence from which an
inference of a pattern or practice of discrimination can be drawn, however,
the court should look with favor on the class action and construe Rule
23(a) liberally. Falcon does not preclude this. 160 The general rule is that
Rule 23 should be liberally construed. 61 The employment discrimina-
tion context does not then require that Rule 23 be narrowly construed.
5. How much proof should be required at the class certification
hearing to satisfy commonality and typicality?
Virtually all courts acknowledge the proposition expressed in Eisen
v. Carlisle &Jacquelin that an inquiry into the merits of the suit is inap-
propriate at the class certification stage.16 2 Some courts strictly adhere
to the Eisen approach, stating for instance that "[flor purposes of deter-
mining class certification, the allegations are taken as true and the merits
of the complaint are not examined. 1' 63 Most courts, however, require
something more than mere allegations to support a decision that Rule
23 prerequisites are satisfied. 64 Although it is unusual to require a mini-
159. Id. at 423.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 83-89.
161. MOORE, supra note 23, at 23.02[4].
162. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
163. Allen v. Isaac, 99 F.R.D. 45, 49 (N.D. Ill. 1983). See Coates v. Johnson
&Johnson, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 421, 423 (N.D. Il. 1981) (Plaintiff's percep-
tions, if supported by well-pleaded factual allegations and, where appropriate, evidence
in the record, are entitled to be accepted as true.).
164. See, e.g., Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366 (11th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff
must demonstrate a reasonable basis for believing that aggrieved persons do exist. See
Meyer v. MacMillan Publishing.Co., 95 F.R.D. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). There must
also be evidence to show that the plaintiff's claim is typical of others and that there
are common questions of law and fact. See Penk v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ.,
99 F.R.D. 495 (D. Or. 1982).
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hearing on the merits, some proof is generally required with regard to
the merits. 165
In the case of class actions attacking more than one employment
practice, except in objective criteria cases, the commonly cited language
in Eisen must be reconciled with the Supreme Court's pronouncement
in Falcon that there must be significant proof of a policy of discrimina-
tion which manifests itself in the same way. 166 Thus in broad-based class
actions, the question is no longer whether proof of the merits will be
required, but how much.
1 67
The plaintiff can satisfy commonality, inter alia, by putting forth
some proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination either using statistics
or affidavits. 6 One court found that the defendant's own study indicating
a "statistically significant relationship between being black and being
promoted" was sufficient. 69 This court said it is not necessary for the
plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of liability at that stage.
70
Typicality can be satisfied by affidavits showing that other members
of the class have grievances similar to those of the plaintiff.' 7' However,
some recent cases indicate that courts are delving into the merits of the
grievances, and actually making preliminary findings of fact 'which
facilitate denial of certification.
7 2
165. See Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 562, 573
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). Probable success on the merits is not a prerequisite to class certifica-
tion. See, e.g., Penk, 99 F.R.D. at 502,
166. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982).
167. See Meyer, 95 F.R.D. at 413-14.
168. See Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 617 (5th
Cir. 1983); Meyer, 95 F.R.D. at 414-15; Moses v. Avco Corp., 97 F.R.D. 20, 23 (D.
Conn. 1982).
169. Jackson v. Fort Worth Nat'l Bank, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1317,
1323 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
170. Id.
171. See Wester v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
199, 203 (D. Minn. 1984); Davidson v. United States Steel Corp., 104 F.R.D. 1, 3
(W.D. Pa. 1984).
172. In Stalvey v. City of Waycross, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 987 (S.D.
Ga. 1985), the court said that an examination of the merits was ordinarily inappropriate.
In this case, however, the court decided that the determination of the prerequisites of
Rule 23, required some preliminary findings of fact, id. at 989, and found, inter alia,
that the defendant showed the court that the plaintiff was terminated in accordance
with the rules and not in a discriminatory manner as she contended. Similarly in Grant
v. Morgan Guaranty Trust, 548 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court said the
plaintiff would not be an adequate representative of a class, because the defendant had
1987] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS 43
Since the plaintiff's initial proof at trial will include making a prima
facie case, requiring such a showing at the class certification hearing
may be requiring too much. Courts should, therefore, require only enough
proof to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding commonal-
ity and typicality, the proof required to withstand a motion for sum-
mary judgment. 1
7 3
B. Rule 23(b)(4), the Remaining Criterion for Adequacy of
Representation: What Proof the Courts Should Require
After a determintion of commonality and typicality, the court should
consider the final factor of adequate representation, adequacy of represen-
tation. The Second Circuit articulated in Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin the
frequently cited requirements for Rule 23(a)(4). 174
[A]n essential concomitant of adequate representation is that the
party's attorney be qualified, experienced and generally able to
conduct the proposed litigation. Additionally, it is necessary to
eliminate so far as possible the likelihood that the litigants are
involved in a collusive suit or that plaintiff has interests antag-
onistic to those of the remainder of the class.175
Implicit in the requirement that no antagonism exist is that the court
must be assured that the representative will vigorously pursue the class
interests.1 76 Thus, the determination should focus on the class represen-
raised substantial issues relating to her poor job performance. Id. at 1193.
In Caston v. Duke Univ., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 102 (M.D.N.C. 1983),
the court required a substantial showing of the merits at the class certification hearing.
The court found the plaintiff's statistics to be "hopelessly flawed," and the nonstatistical
evidence was insufficient to sustain the plaintiff's burden of proof. Id. at 110-12.
In Ray v. Phelps Dodge Brass Co., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 997 (N.D.
Ala. 1983), the court struck a balance between Eisen (no examination of the merits)
and Falcon (significant proof of a discriminatory policy). It required prima facie proof
that there was a nexus between the plaintiff's claim and the disparate impact of the
policy or practice in the categories affected. With regard to numerosity, the Ray court
required proof that the employer had subjected at least twenty putative class members
to similar treatment. Id. at 1000.
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. See generally Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 724-36.
174. Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded,
417 U.S. 156 (1974).
175. 391 F.2d at 562.
176. See MOORE, supra note 23, 23.07[1]; 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 110, § 3.22.
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tative's motivation, vigor of his or her representation, his or her class
counsel's performance, and whether any antagonism exists between the
claims of the plaintiff and those of the class.
With regard to class counsel, "[c]ourts may take into account any
prior failure to proceed in the best interest of the putative class ...
as well as counsel's general qualifications."' 7 7 Nevertheless, courts have
evidently found it difficult to declare class counsel incompetent, based
on lack of experience or ability, to represent the class. Thus, the courts
still look mainly at counsel's performance. In recent cases in which courts
have found class counsel to be incompetent to represent the class, counsel
has not been diligent in prosecuting the suit, 1 78 filing the motion for
class certification,179 or taking discovery. 
80
The other element of adequate representation focuses on the named
plaintiffs themselves. There must be no evidence of collusion or conflict
of interest between the named plaintiff and members of the class.' 8 1 In
addition
a named plaintiff must display some minimal level of interest
in the action, familiarity with the practices challenged, and ability
to assist in decisionmaking as to the conduct of the litigation
... [A] court can and should insist on a named plaintiff who
takes some active interest and has some ability to contribute
to the action.
18 2
Thus, in addition to having no active conflict with the class, the plaintiff
must be willing to act for the class and not just in his or her own self
177. Wofford v. Safeway Stores, 78 F.R.D. 460, 486 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See Har-
riss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 74 F.R.D. 24 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
178. See, e.g., Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2896 (1986); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1679 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
179. See, e.g., Minority Police Officers Ass'n v. South Bend, 555 F. Supp. 921
(N.D. Ind. 1983), modified, 721 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1983).
180. See, e.g., Andrews, 780 F.2d at 124.
181. See Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated
and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). In one case, the Court of Appeals in affirming decer-
tification of the class noted that representatives of the various subclasses fought among
themselves, stipulated a definition of the class which excluded one of the subclass represen-
tatives, and produced completely inadequate class proof at trial. Hervey v. City of Lit-
tle Rock, 787 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 (8th Cir. 1986).
182. Wofford v. Safeway Stores, 78 F.R.D. 460, 487 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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interest. The plaintiff should have "a sense of identity with and an emo-
tional tie to the class which he alleges is the subject of discrimination.
In many cases he may be motivated by a personal drive to eradicate
general injustice against his class.' '183
Although the considerations which the court should review in mak-
ing a determination regarding adequacy of representation should be
limited to counsel's performance and the class representative's motives,
all too frequently courts inject the issues of commonality and typicality
into such a determination. While these considerations are vital to an
overall determination of adequacy of representation, if Rule 23(a)(2),
(commonality) and (3) (typicality) have been met, then these issues should
not be completely re-examined for Rule 23(a)(4) purposes. Indeed, it
is unfortunate that the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement is termed "adequate
representation," when Rule 23(a)(2) and (3) are necessary concomitants
to the overall finding of adequate representation.1
84
As the Second Circuit said in Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, along
with the assurance that counsel is competent to conduct the litigation
and that plaintiffs have no conflicts of interest with the class, "[c]ourts,
on occasion have also required that the interest of the representative
party be co-extensive with the interest of the entire class . . . . [T]his
amounts to little more than an alternative way of stating that the plain-
tiffs claim must be typical of those of the entire class ... "18
The relationship of the plaintiff's claim to the remainder of the class
should be analyzed under Rule 23(a)(4) only insofar as it bears on the
plaintiff's interest in being a standard bearer for a class of persons whose
claims are not identical to his own. The judge should determine whether
the class representative is interested enough in the class to be an ade-
quate representative. The less typical the plaintiff's claim is of the class
claims, the more important his personal motivations and attributes
become. Thus, even if the plaintiff's claim is not identical to those of
the class, the adequacy of representation requirement should be met if
he is a vigorous representative.
86
183. Smalls, supra note 23, at 842.
184. See supra text accompanying note 106.
185. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1968).
186. For example, in Falcon the plaintiff was found to be an inadequate represen-
tative of a class of persons not hired, since he had been hired and his claim was limited
to promotion. Because of Falcon's vigorous representation, however, the class was awarded
$39,000 by the trial court. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 153 (1983).
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If the plaintiff has the will and the ability to inform himself
of the present practices of the defendant, to amass testimony
and to inform himself as to all matters within the scope of the
complaint, then the fact that his claim and defenses are not iden-
tical with those of every member of the class should be of little
moment.8 7
The trial judge is perfectly capable of making this determination,
and the Rules give him considerable discretion in making these deter-
minations and managing the class. In cases in which the plaintiff is in-
different to the claims of the class, obviously he or she is not an ade-
quate representative.18 8 Under this rubric, however, courts have added
cases which they characterize as so highly individualized that the plain-
tiff is disqualified from representing a class.' 89 This characteristic should
be determined under Rule 23(a)(3) (typicality), not Rule 23(a)(4).
Since the courts are reluctant to declare counsel incompetent, the
principal concern under Rule 23(a)(4) has been whether antagonism ex-
ists between the interests of the named plaintiff and the class. In this
context the court should concentrate on whether, even though the plain-
tiff's claim is typical of those in the class and common issues exist, the
plaintiff's interests conflict with those of a significant number of the class
members. 190
In order to be typical, the claims of the plaintiff need not be co-
extensive with the claims of the class. That is, they need not be the
same as all the claims of the class. If, however, some of the claims of
the class conflict with the claims of the plaintiff, then Rule 23(a)(4) is
called into question, despite the fact that Rule 23(a)(3) may have been
satisfied. 191
Especially since Falcon, courts have found antagonism in anomalous
situations. 192 In such cases, however, the conflicts are potential conflicts.
187. Smalls, supra note 23, at 836.
188. See Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1985).
189. See, e.g., Patterson v. General Motors, 631 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 9140 (1981).
190. See Floyd, Civil Rights Class Actions in the 1980's: The Burger Court's Pragmatic
Approach to Problems of Adequate Representation and Justiciability, 1984 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1 for
an excellent discussion of how the problem of class dissidence should be resolved.
191. See 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 110, § 24.30.
192. For example, in Freeman v. Motor Convoy, 700 F.2d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir.
1983), the court said antagonism existed between an employee and applicants, because
the latter might be entitled to retroactive seniority. In Maddox v. Claytor, 38 Fair Empl.
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If potential conflicts are made the basis for invalidating a class represen-
tative, then no representative will be able to qualify, since all class
members compete with each other at some point for promotions, better
pay, or other forms of job advancement. The better view is that Rule
23(a)(4) addresses actual, not speculative, conflicts. 193
Some courts have found conflicts by focusing on attorneys repre-
senting the class. For example, one court found antagonism in the fact
that attorneys representing various classes fought among themselves.
194
Another court found correctly that the plaintiff became "of counsel"
for the attorney handling the case and had previously investigated the
claims of the class member as a fair employment compliance officer of
the defendant. The court decided that the plaintiff's interest in attorneys'
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 755, 756 (M.D. Ga. 1983), the antagonism was found between
employees and applicants, because they would be competing for some of the same jobs.
Indeed the Supreme Court in a footnote in Falcon appears to approve such conclusions:
"In employment discrimination litigation, conflicts might arise, for example, between
employees and applicants who were denied employment and who will, if granted relief,
compete with employees for fringe benefits or seniority. Under Rule 23, the same plain-
tiff could not represent these classes." 457 U.S. at 158 n.13 (quoting General Tel. Co.
v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980)).
193. See Wilmington Firefighters Local 1590 v. City of Wilmington, 109 F.R.D.
89 (D. Del. 1985) (The court held that the plaintiff was not an inadequate represen-
tative because he was more likely to be promoted than other class members.); American
Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D.
Wash. 1983) (mere speculation that conflict could develop at the remedy stage is insuffi-
cient). Compare Rosario v. Cook County, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 905 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) with Allen v. Isaac, 99 F.R.D. 45 (N.D. Ill. 1983). This disagreement regard-
ing antagonism existed before Falcon. Compare Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 90
F.R.D. 263 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (conflict because representative and class members all
competing for same jobs) with Spies v. C. Itoh & Co., 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
637, 642-43 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (no antagonism even though competing for same jobs).
In an interesting development, one court cited the vigorous dass representation
by the union's attorneys as one factor which belied the defendant's contention that a
conflict could arise between the unions members who were not members of the class
and those who were. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, 578 F. Supp. at 849.
Courts also have difficulty with whether a plaintiff who is in two protected groups,
such as a black female, can represent persons in both groups. Some courts say that
this is a conflict and that the plaintiff can represent one or the other, but not both.
See Moore v. National Assoc. of Secur. Dealers, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1738,
1743-44 (D.D.C. 1982). Others allow the plaintiff to represent both protected groups
in one class. Int'l Woodworkers v. Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp., 659 F.2d 1259
(4th Cir. 1981).
194. Hervey v. City of Little Rock, 787 F.2d 1223, 1227 (8th Cir. 1986).
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fees conflicted with her interest in the class, and that as a compliance
officer she had discussed defense strategy with the defendant. Thus, she
could not serve as class representative.
195
Courts have been presented with a variety of other objections to
the class representative, 196 such as the defendant's contention that the
plaintiff was not discriminated against. In response to this claim, some
courts have improperly examined the merits of the plaintiff's claim, found
it to be lacking, and consequently held that the plaintiff is an inade-
quate representative. 197 For example, a court held that because an
employer had raised a substantial issue regarding the employee's poor
job performance, it precluded plaintiff from being an adequate represen-
tative of the class.
198
Courts which engage in pretrial examination of the merits of the
named plaintiff's claim defeat the policy of Rule 23. They stretch the
limits of the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement by speculating about remotely
possible antagonism and basing their decision on such speculation. 199
There are, of course, cases in which the plaintiff clearly is an in-
adequate class representative. This is illustrated well by the Rodriguez
case. 20 0 The defendant demonstrated that antagonism existed between
a significant number of the class members and the named plaintiffs; many
195. See Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1679 (N.D.
Tex. 1983).
196. For example, courts have struggled with the plaintiffs inability to pay the
costs of the litigation. See EEOC v. Printing Indus. of Metro. Washington, D.C., 92
F.R.D. 51, 54 (D.D.C. 1981). If this is a seminal criterion, no poor person could sue
and the public policy of Title VII could not be vindicated. See Allen v. Isaac, 99 F.R.D.
45, 53 (N.D. Ill. 1983). This is a frequently cited criterion for adequacy of representa-
tion. See, e.g., Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 421,
422 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (one of the reasons plaintiff was an adequate representative was
his lack of necessary resources). However, it is clearly a sensitive area and courts rarely
deny class certification on this ground alone. See Wilmington Firefighters Local 1590
v. City of Wilmington, 109 F.R.D. 89, 94 (D. Del. 1985); 4 H. NEWBERG, supra note 110,
24.35.
197. See supra note 172.
198. Grant v. Morgan Guaranty Trust, 548 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
199. See supra note 192. Still other courts have considered whether the plaintiff's
length of absence from the job affected his ability to represent the class. See, e.g., Boykin
v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 706 F.2d 1384, 1387 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1006 (1984) (Length of absence from the job was determined not to be the question.
The willingness and ability of plaintiffs to represent the class were at issue.).
200. East Texas Motor Freight System v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
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of the class members had indicated that they did not want some of the
relief requested by the named plaintiffs. 20 1 In addition, the named plaintiffs
were obviously not vigorous class representatives, since they failed to
move for class certification and stipulated away the class claim.
20 2
In short, the courts should examine real rather than speculative con-
flicts, the competence of class counsel, and the characteristics of the named
plaintiff in making a determination of adequacy of representation. These
considerations should then be applied against a background of the already
settled issues of typicality and commonality to determine whether the
named plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class.
Before automatically denying certification, the court should examine
the possibility of whether subclassing or redefining the class will eliminate
the conflict.20 3 For example, when the court discerns a possible conflict
between the interests of black females and white females, subclassing
can relieve the conflict. 20 4 Allowing an appropriate representative to in-
tervene is another possibility. 20 5 In any event, the court can always modify
the class if conflicts emerge and cannot be avoided.
20 6
In a narrowly defined class action, conflicts of interest will be easier
to discern. In a broader based class action, court monitoring of such
conflicts becomes more important. The more people the plaintiff represents
who are not in his or her exact situation, the more likely conflicts are
to occur. Thus, the court should satisfy itself that the plaintiff and class
counsel will vigorously represent the interests of the class and not subvert
such interests to their own. Similarly, in a broader based class action,
the court must assure itself that class counsel is representing the interests
of the class, not just counsel's or the plaintiff's own interest. The fact
that broader based class actions may require more monitoring on the
part of the court does not mean that such classes should be eliminated.
201. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983). (Trial court denied class certification, because some
students could have been in favor of the practice of allowing dog sniffs in school which
was the subject of the suit. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the defendant school
district could present to the court arguments in support of the contention that sniffing
is not an unconstitutional search.)
202. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 400.
203. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c); 1 NEWBERG, supra note 110, S 3.25.
204. See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195, 1198 (5th Cir. 1984).
205. See 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note 110, § 3.25.
206. FED. R. Cxv. P. 23(c)(1). See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,
160 (1983).
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Courts should simply be willing to accept responsibility for managing
class actions. Such responsibility would include overseeing vigorous
representation, competence of class counsel, and lack of real conflicts.
C. Numerosity
Although numerosity is listed as the first requirement of Rule 23,
it cannot be determined until the class has been found to meet the other
three requirements. 20 7 The class representative need not identify all class
members or their exact numbers, but he or she must define the class
so that the court can determine whether the class is sufficiently numerous
and whether a particular person is truly a member of it.208
Although it may not be necessary to determine exact number, the
plaintiff must raise a presumption of numerosity.20 9 In order to show
impracticability of joinder, courts generally require some concrete proof
that more than a minimal number of persons have been affected.
210
Some courts do not apply the numerosity requirement as strictly
in cases in which the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief on behalf of future
class members, that is, where the emphasis is less on damages and more
on future compliance. 211 Finally, when qualifying under the numerosity
requirement is a close question, the court should strike the balance in
favor of satisfaction of numerosity and decertify the class later if
necessary .
21 2
207. See Moore v. National Assoc. of Secur. Dealers, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1738, 1744 (D.D.C. 1982).
208. See Meyers, Title VII Class Action: Promises and Pitfalls, 8 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
767, 776-77 (1977); 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 23, at § 1760.
209. EEOC v. Printing Indus. of Metro. Washington, D.C., 92 F.R.D. 51, 53
(D.D.C. 1981).
210. S eJones v. Flagship Int'l, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1679, 1681 (N.D.
Tex. 1983); Rowe v. Prudential Property Ins. Co., 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
762, 764 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Lane v. Bethelhem Steel Corp., 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1033, 1035 (D. Md. 1981).
211. See Wester v. Special School District No. 1, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
199, 202 (D. Minn. 1984). Courts have granted class status to classes with as few as
13 members and denied such status to classes as large as 300. 1 H. NEWBERG, supra note
110, § 3.03. The Supreme Court has indicated that a class of fewer than fifteen would
be too small. General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980).
212. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Evans v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.,
696 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir. 1983); Stalvey v. City of Waycross, 37 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 987, 992 (S.D. Ga. 1985).
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'Class status is frequently denied by courts which require the "in-
terest or injury" of the plaintiff and class to be virtually identical. The
requirement of identical "interest or injury" means that classes will be
small and, therefore, the numerosity requirement will not be met. For
example, in Everitt v. City of Marshall, the court said that, although the
plaintiff presented an impressive argument that the racially discriminatory
practices were common to both civil service and unclassified employees,
their claims were not common.2 13 The plaintiff was allowed to represent
only eight black employees in civil service departments. The class failed
for numerosity. As Judge Murnaghan predicted in his dissent, by focus-
ing on dissimilarities, courts are applying "same interest, same injury"
to reduce many employment discrimination classes into classes of one. 214
This is in fact the tendency of many courts after Falcon and Rodnguez.
For example, in upholding a post-trial decertification in Roby v. St. Louis
Southwestern Rwy. Co., the court said that the plaintiffs could represent
only those black persons who failed to "take service" in another job
within fifteen days after furlough and those black persons who failed
the forced engineer's examination.21 5 Since there were only four possi-
ble members of such a class, the numerosity requirement was not met.
Certification will almost always fail where classes are defined as narrow-
ly as possible.
216
In another case, the plaintiff had attempted to prosecute a broad-
based class action. The court defined the class, however, not as all per-
sons denied promotion, but as employees who were qualified for promo-
tion, sought promotion to a specific opening, and were not promoted.
21 7
The court reasoned that it was not known, inter alia, whether potential
class members had been denied promotion because they were actually
less qualified. As a result of such reasoning, only between twenty and
thirty black women qualified as class members. Since the class was less
than thirty, the court decided that numerosity was not present. Thus,
213. Everitt v. City of Marshall, 703 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.s. 895 (1983).
214. Abron v. Black & Decker (U.S.), 654 F.2d 951, 961 (4th Cir. 1981) (Mur-
naghan, J., dissenting).
215. Roby v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co., 775 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1985).
216. Batesville Casket Co. EEO Litig., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1560,
1563 (D.D.C. 1984).
217. Rowe v. Prudential Property Ins. Co., 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
762, 764 (N.D. Ga. 1983). See supra text accompanying note 172.
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by limiting the class and by improperly requiring proof of the merits
of the class claims, class certification failed for lack of numerosity.
Other courts, although defining a large broad-based class, have
simply found that joinder of large numbers is practicable. They have
interpreted the practicability requirement in a flexible manner.2 18
Many courts apply the numerosity requirement purely as a matter
of numbers. For example, in Batesville Casket Co. EEO Litigation, after
whittling down the class to currently employed black salesmen, the court
found that there were only eleven class members. The court admitted
that because of the geographic dispersion, joinder would not be easy,
but decided that the class was not so numerous that joinder was
impracticable. 219
However, courts usually recognize that impracticability of joinder
should not be decided by numbers alone. Rather "the nature of the
relief sought, the ability of the individuals to press their own claims,
the practicability of forcing religitation of a common core of issues, and
administrative difficulties involved in interpretation and joinder" 2 0 should
also be considered.
218. In Lucky v. Board of Regents, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 986 (S.D.
Fla. 1981), the court found that the maximum number in the class was 100. Since all
100 were current employees and easily identifiable, the court held joinder was not im-
practicable. Similarly, in Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2896 (1986), the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, which
had honed the class down to a maximum size of forty-nine. Since the plaintiffs were
all easily identified and in the same geographical area, the court decided that joinder
was not impracticable.
As expressed in Wright, Miller & Kane, " '[Ilmpracticable' does not mean 'im-
possible.' The representatives only need show that it is extremely difficult or inconven-
ient to join all the members of the class." WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 23, S 1762.
Providing a limit to how practicability can be manipulated to find lack of numerosity
is an Eleventh Circuit decision in Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546
(11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 274 (1986). The Eleventh Circuit reversed the
lower court's decertification of a class of forty-seven. The court indicated its disapproval
of denial of certification to a class of forty-seven. But see Rutherglen, Notice, Scope and
Preclusion, supra note 35, at 22-35; Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124 (1st
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2896 (1986) (court affirmed denial of certification to
class of forty-nine based on numerosity).
219. Batesville Casket Co. EEO Litig., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1560,
1562-63 (D.D.C. 1984).
220. Rosario v. Cook County, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 905 (N.D. Ill.
1983). In Rosario, all of these factors weighed in favor of finding numerosity for a class
of twenty. The court relied especially on the nature of the relief sought, which was
elimination of performance evaluations and written examination as promotion criteria.
Such factors would affect all future applicants for promotion. Id. at 906.
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Thus, in Allen v. Isaac, the class consisted of at least seventeen peo-
ple, and joinder was impracticable due to geographic dispersion. 22 1 The
court noted that when a class is large, numbers alone are dispositive
of impracticability of joinder. When, as here, the numbers are small,
other factors, such as geographic dispersion and the ability of the in-
dividuals to press their own claims, are important to test impracticabil-
ity. On the latter point, the court said that "[c]omplicating an employee's
ability to pursue his own claim, is the fear that his job will be jeopar-
dized by bringing his employer to court.
'222
Some courts seize upon the failure of enough persons' coming for-
ward and admitting to having claims against the employer as evidence
of lack typicality. 223 Other courts, however, recognize that
[tjhere can be judicial notice that employees are apprehensive
concerning loss of jobs and the welfare of their families. They
are frequently unwilling to pioneer an undertaking of this kind
since they are unsure as to whether the court will support them.
Even if they do prevail, they are apprehensive about offending
the employer as a result of taking a stand. These are all factors
that enter into the impracticability issue . .. [which is] depen-
dent not on any arbitrary limit but upon the circumstances sur-
rounding the case.
224
The requirement of impracticability of joinder should be more flex-
ible in an employment suit, since "most, if not all, of the current
employees will be hesitant to join."225 Despite the anti-retaliatory provi-
sion of Title VII, 2 26 employers may be able to get away with retaliating.
It is up to the employee to prove that whatever action the employer
221. Allen v. Isaac, 99 F.R.D. 45 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
222. 99 F.R.D. at 53. The court also found that the relitigation of common issues
increases the cost of litigation and that pursuing the claims singly is not economical.
223. See, e.g., Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, 597 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
rev'd on other grounds, 798 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1986).
224. Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 555 F.2d 270, 275 (10th Cir. 1977).
225. Slanina v. William Penn Parking Corp., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1426, 1429 (W.D. Pa. 1984). See Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d
270 (10th Cir. 1977); Moore v. National Assoc. of Secur. Dealers, 37 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1745, 1747 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 762 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Rosario
v. Cook County, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 905 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1982).
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
took was in retaliation for the employee's charge or testimony againsi
the employer.
227
Thus, courts in analyzing the numerosity requirement in an employ-
ment discrimination suit, should take into account that fear of retalia-
tion will prevent the vast majority of employees from joining a suit,
thereby making joinder impracticable. If any significant number of
employees are potential class members, numerosity should be satisfied.
D. Other Obstacles Encountered by Plaintiffs Seeking to Represent a
Class
The would be class representative faces a number of obstacles to
successful prosecution of a Title VII class action in addition to restric-
tive application of Rule 23(a) requirements. The scope of this article
does not permit coverage of all of these. Nevertheless, in order to put
in perspective the point that the courts have raised barriers to fulfill-
ment of Title VII's goal in the area of class actions, a reference to other
developments which have an impact on class actions is appropriate.
While all of the developments in the Title VII area have not been
negative, 28 several Supreme Court cases, in addition to Rodriguez and
Falcon, have had a negative impact on the ability of Title VII plaintiffs
to succeed on a class basis. 229 In United Airlines v. Evans,230 the Court
effectively eliminated the theory that if past discrimination has present
effects then it is a continuing violation and is not barred by the statute
of limitations. Thus, after Evans the plaintiff must file a charge within
180 days, or in some circumstances within 300 days, of the alleged
discriminatory act, regardless of whether the act has continuing conse-
227. Lewis v. NLRB, 750 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1985).
228. See, e.g., Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984) (Individual
claims not barred by judgment on class action); General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S.
318 (1980) (under Title VII, Rule 23 is not applicble to an enforcement action brought
by the EEOC); Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (putative
class member may intervene to appeal denial of class certification).
229. Other decisions have had a negative impact on the ability of the individual
Title VII plaintiff to succeed. See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981) (in a disparate treatment case, the defendant must only articulate
and need not prove nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions); Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273 (1982) (the finding of discriminatory intent is a finding of fact which
is subject to the clearly erroneous standard).
230. United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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quences. The impact for class actions is that the only persons who can
become members of the class are those who have filed charges or who
have had claims within 180 days (in some cases 300 days)2 31 of tle time
the earliest charge was filed. 23 2 It is clear that this has a substantial ef-
fect on the number of persons eligible to be considered as class members.
A further limitation on class actions is the questionable ability of
a class representative whose claims are moot to continue representing
the class. Although the Supreme Court has left the door open for such
representation, 23 3 this holding will be useful only in limited cases. In-
deed, the question arises as to how a person with a moot claim can
adequately represent a class applying Falcon and Rodriguez.
23 4
In addition, although a disqualified class representative may be
replaced by another class member, many courts have effectively limited
intervention to those who have filed charges on the issues the original
representative sought to raise. 235 In the usual case, however, when a
class representative is disqualified on the basis of Falcon, it is because
he lacks the same interest as the class. Therefore, other class members
will not qualify as intervenors. 236 The basis for such decisions is that
the EEOC has not had an opportunity to settle or reconcile the non-
charged issue with the employer.
237
In general, the allegations of the complaint must be similar or related
to the allegations of the charge or growing out of the investigation. In
231. See, e.g., Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1442 (9th Cir.
1984), modified, 742 F.2d 520 (1984).
232. Christman v. American Cyanamid Co., 92 F.R.D. 441, 448 (N.D. Va. 1981).
233. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
234. See Floyd, supra note 190, at 44-51.
235. Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1983).
236. See, e.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 723 F.2d 1195, 1201
(5th Cir. 1984). The court said the proposed intervenor who has not filed a charge
can only attack practices which the named plaintiff could attack. See also Falcon v. General
Tel. Co., 457 U.S. 147 (1985).
237. Id. See also supra note 16. As a counterbalance to the restrictive view of who
can intervene, the court in Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984), allowed intervention based on the futility of
first exhausting administrative remedies. Although the claims were not the same, the
court held they were sufficiently similar - promotion as opposed to termination, demo-
tions and hiring. Thus, the court held it was not necessary for the intervenor to exhaust
administrative remedies for the promotion claim, since the EEOC had been unable to
conciliate the demotion, termination, and hiring claims. 720 F.2d at 335.
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the past, courts have liberally construed this rule.23 8 Recently, however,
some courts have narrowed interpretation of the rule.
23 9
Requiring non-charge filing intervenors to raise only issues which
the plaintiff raised in his charge and allowing only claims raised in the
charge to be alleged in the complaint creates still further obstacles for
class actions. These obstacles are enhanced by the fact that since its 1977
reorganization, the EEOC has encouraged narrowly defined individual
charges and limited investigations.2 4 0 In addition, many complainants
are not represented by counsel at this phase.
24 1
Another problem which surfaced before Falcon, but which has been
further stimulated by that case, is the type of proof necessary in class
action suits. In employment discrimination cases, there are two theories
of discrimination, disparate treatment and disparate impact. The disparate
treatment theory of discrimination involves different treatment of per-
sons based on a protected characteristic such as race. The disparate im-
pact theory is based on the existence of a policy or practice which has
an adverse impact on a protected group as compared to another group.
The proof required to show disparate impact is generally statistical analysis
proving that the policy falls more heavily on a protected class than on
other groups. Unlike the disparate impact theory, the disparate treat-
ment theory requires proof of the employer's intent to discriminate.
2 42
238. See Sanchez v. Standard Brands, 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970). SCHLEI &
GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1117-21.
239. See Evans v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925 (11th Cir.
1983). See also Ekanem v. Health and Hospital Corp., 724 F.2d 563 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). The court limited the claims to those falling within
the scope of the charge. The court said the fact that the EEOC expanded its investiga-
tion and issued its determination on a broader basis was irrelevant. 724 F.2d at 573.
240. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10.
241. Other problems confronted by class plaintiffs include defendants who attempt
to limit discovery at the outset based on Falcon. See, e.g., Velasquez v. Faurer, 101 F.R.D.
8 (D. Md. 1983). Also, many jurisdictions have local rules governing the amount of
time the plaintiff has to file a motion for class certification, some of which are unrealistically
short. See, e.g., Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1679 (N.D.
Tex. 1983) (The local rule required the motion to be filed ninety days after the com-
plaint was filed. Although the plaintiff had moved for two extensions, the court cited
her motion as being six months late under the local rule.).
242. Proof of disparate impact is used to attack employment criteria such as tests
and educational requirements, which impact more harshly on a protected class. See Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Rowe
v. Prudential Property Ins. Co., 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 762 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
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A racial imbalance is not sufficient to show intent.2 43 Gross statistical
disparities, however, or significant other evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion have been held to be sufficient. 244 Isolated instances of discrimina-
tion are insufficient to establish a pattern or practice of discrimination. 245
However, employees are as reluctant to testify regarding discriminatory
acts as they are to file charges and join the suit in the first place.
24 6
Thus, many employees will not testify.
The Court in Falcon pointed out another reason the plaintiff's claim
was atypical. He was attempting to prove his claim using proof of disparate
treatment, while the class proof was based on the disparate impact theory
and included statistical analysis. 247 Thus, since the usual method of prov-
ing individual claims is by using the disparate treatment theory,2 4 8 class
claims must be proven the same way. Since disparate treatment cases
require more proof than disparate impact cases, the Court has raised
yet another obstacle for the Title VII class claimant.
Furthermore, in Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that subjective employment decisions resulting in
discrimination were evidence of intentional discrimination and could not
be analyzed under the disparate impact theory. 24 '9 Rather the proper
method of proof was the disparate treatment model.
250
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Pouncy rationale in Gn'ffin v. Carlin,
stating that "Title VII requires the elimination of 'artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment.' "251 The Supreme Court in
243. Fuanco Construction v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978).
244. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339.
245. See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 857 (1984).
246. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1286-87.
247. See supra text accompanying note 85.
248. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 10, at 1322.
249. 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
250. See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1981); Sheehan v.
Purolator, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Rowe v. Prudential Property Ins.
Co., 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 762 (N.D. Ga. 1983). See generally Zahorick v.
Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984). Cf Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11th
Cir. 1985) (disparate impact was the proper method of proof in cases involving multi-
component selection procedures or subjective procedure).
251. Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1525 (11th Cir. 1985). The court also stated
that "[e]xclusion of such subjective practices from the reach of the disparate impact
model of analysis is likely to encourage employers to use subjective, rather than objec-
tive, selection criteria." Id.
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Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,252 which originated the disparate impact analysis,
did not distinguish between objective and subjective criteria as Pouncy
had.
253
Thus, strict construction of Rule 23 in employment discrimination
class actions is only one obstacle among many for the Title VII plaintiff.
The conclusion is inescapable that the courts have indeed rebuilt the
barriers Title VII was enacted to eliminate.
IV. CONCLUSION
The argument that Rule 23 requirements must be strictly and nar-
rowly applied is based on the fact that, if the plaintiff is not an adequate
representative, the class will be injured because of the res judicata effect
of an adverse judgment. 254 However, few employees are willing to risk
suing their employer - the ultimate act of disloyalty in a country of
employers who demand loyalty from their employees.
255
It takes a brave, if not foolhardy, soul to sue his or her employer
- whether potential, prospective, present, or former. Even with the pro-
tection of the anti-retaliation provisions of the Act, 256 no employee has
such a perfect record that the employer cannot manufacture and sup-
port a reason to discipline or discharge him. 257 Naturally, employees
are not rushing to join a class or testify against their employer at a class
certification hearing. Furthermore, it often takes the disgruntled,
rebellious, less-than-perfect employee to raise the claim for the class. The
courts expect the perfect class representative, the model employee who,
252. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
253. 755 F.2d at 1524. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791,
815 (5th Cir. 1986) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 3227 (1987).
During the production of this article, the Court vacated and remanded Watson, deciding
that subjective decision-making should be susceptible to proof using the disparate impact
theory. A plurality of the Court, however, while agreeing that the disparate impact theory
was appropriate, interpreted the allocation of burdens of proof in such cases to be essen-
tially the same as it is in disparate treatment cases. Therefore, under the plurality's
interpretation, the plaintiff would bear the heavier burden, regardless of which theory
was used. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
254. Rutherglen, Notice, Scope and Preclusion, supra note 36, at 75-84. Wilton, The
Class Action in Social Reform Litigation: In Whose Interest?, 63 B.U.L. REV. 597 (1983).
255. "There is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty
to his employer." NLRB v. Local 1229, 346 U.S. 464, 472 (1953).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1982).
257. This is not to say that employers are all acting in bad faith to circumvent
the Act. However, the employer's attitude toward the employee often changes and the
perception of that employee's performance cannot but be affected.
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despite his or her exemplary conduct and work record, is blatantly
discriminated against in every aspect of employment (within six months
of filing a charge). Such a fact pattern may be necessary at present to
allow him or her to claim the same interest or injury as a class of
employees. These employees no doubt all suffer quietly and hope for
vindication by a bolder class representative.
Thus, the employees who step forward may not be the best class
representatives. The class will, however, not be represented otherwise,
and the claims of the class will not be vindicated. The Falcon case il-
lustrates this point. Although Falcon had no live hiring claim, he
represented such a class to the Supreme Court. The $39,000 award he
had won for the class was reversed, and Falcon himself was ordered
to pay $7,000 in appeals costs. The message to class members and poten-
tial plaintiffs is: proceed at your peril.
25 8
In addition to the fact that individual cases are less likely to be
brought and are difficult to prove, they are frequently not worth the
amount of money involved. 25 9 Furthermore, it is difficult to attract com-
petent counsel to an individual suit, because there is less chance of set-
tlement and greater chance of loss. 260 In addition, even if an individual
is successful, it is doubtful whether injunctive relief which covers anyone
other than the plaintiff will result from litigation.
261
The threat of individual suits offers little incentive to employers to
avoid discrimination, while the threat of class action suits is very effec-
tive in forcing employers to eliminate even the subtlest forms of discrimina-
tion. This does not mean that most employers intentionally discriminate,
although those that do will be able to continue to do so with relative
impunity. Rather the problem is that those employers formerly concerned
with affirmative action and zealous supervision to insure the elimination
of subtle forms of discrimination no longer have the incentive to pursue
these concerns. Such supervision takes time, energy, and money. It is
not cost effective if the threat of consequences is remote.
Other arguments in favor of class actions in employment discrimina-
tion suits are ones justifying the class action generally. For instance,
unitary resolution of claims avoids the cost of duplicative litigation. 262
258. See Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV.
947, 1000-02 (1982); Comment, Title VII Class Actions: A New Era, 62 NEB. L. REV.
130, 149 (1983). Cf Rutherglen, supra note 15, at 704.
259. See Comment, supra note 258.
260. See Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 704.
261. Id.
262. Id.
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Such resolution is thus more economical and avoids subjecting the defen-
dant to inconsistent orders and prevents unfair treatment of claims of
unrepresented absent members.
263
In employment discrimination actions, however, avoiding inconsis-
tent orders is usually a hypothetical consideration. In fact, only a few
persons with a claim will come forward. Paradoxically, since individuals
are reluctant to come forward out of fear of retaliation, Title VII class
actions should be favored, rather than discouraged.
Furthermore, the principal argument for restrictive certifications,
the res judicata effect of an adverse determination, is also largely academic.
In Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, the Supreme Court made it clear that,
although further litigation regarding class issues is precluded by an adverse
judgment on class issues, individual plaintiffs still have a live cause of
action in most cases regarding their individual claims of discrimination.2 64
If it should later appear that the plaintiff was an inadequate represen-
tative, the Court has also left open the possibility that a plaintiff without
a live claim can continue to represent the class or can be replaced by
an intervenor. 265 In addition, if at any time it appears that the plaintiff
is an inadequate representative, then even after trial, the class can be
decertified. 266 Thus, the detrimental effect of an adverse judgment on
the class also appears to be largely illusory.
Certainly not all individual claims should automatically become class
actions. However, certain individual claims are appropriate for class treat-
ment. Rodriguez and Falcon require that all of the requirements of Rule
23 be met. There should be no quarrel with this holding. The courts
which interpret the requirements too restrictively are, however, as
predicted, draining the life out of Title VII.267 "Pointedly, the vitality
of across-the-board suits ought not be decided in the milieu of pruden-
tial limitation. Instead it ought to be decided in the context of congres-
263. The Proper Scope of Representation, supra note 63, at 188-89; Miller, Class Actions
and Employment Discrimination Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 Miss. L.J.
275, 282-83 (1972).
264. 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
265. United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980) (the case
does not become moot if class certified, although plaintiff's claim moot); Deposit Guaranty
Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
266. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). See, e.g., Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
628 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1980).
267. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (Godbold, J.,
concurring).
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sional objective; particularly so when those objectives are broadly stated
and the means of achieving them are largely left to the courts."
268
If a class can rarely be certified in the first place, making allowances
at later stages is ineffectual. The Supreme Court has recently announced
that the EEOC does not have to comply with Rule 23.269 However, allow-
ing the EEOC to avoid the requirements of Rule 23 on the theory that
EEOC actions alone can enforce Title VII is ludicrous. The most effec-
tive enforcement tool is the private class action, and such actions should
not be virtually eliminated by the courts.
270
There is no question that the days of wholesale class actions filed
for the sake of winning a large undeserved settlement based on a frivolous
individual claim were reprehensible. 271 The answer, however, does not
lie in forbidding all such actions, but rather in ensuring that there is
a good faith motivation for the class suit. Rule 23(a)(4) in large measure
provides a test for making such distinctions.
The plaintiff should be required to make a strong showing that he
or she can meet the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement of adequate representa-
tion; he or she must show that the counsel is competent, that he or she
will be a vigorous representative for the class, and that no true antagonism
exists. Then the other three requirements should be less strictly applied.
The courts should not require that the plaintiffs claims be identical to
those of the class. They should also be willing to certify smaller classes
in employment discrimination cases.
The court is required to oversee the class action and should be able
to assess, as the litigation progresses, whether Rule 23(a)(4) is met. If
it is not, the class should be decertified. If there is any conflict between the
plaintiff and the class, the defendant will generally bring to the court's atten-
tion that conflict or any other failure bearing on adequate representation. 272
268. Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420, 430 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
See Anderson, supra note 36, at 920.
269. General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
270. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 800 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 3227 (1987) [see supra note 253 for
discussion of Watson]; see also supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
271. See Shawe, supra note 118, at 487-92.
272. Since Title VII relief is equitable in nature, the plaintiffs are not entitled
to a jury trial. It has been argued that, since they have given up a jury trial, they
should have the right to have their case heard effectively. Effective hearing cannot always
be accomplished through an individual action. Liberal construction of Rule 23 is therefore
19871
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"The class action has been the greatest instrument in enforcing Title
VII's promise that invidious race discrimination shall have no role in
the workplace. Without the efficiency and economy of this procedural
tool, it is safe to say that the injury of thousands would have remained
both undiscovered and unredressed. "273 In addition to unredressed claims,
probably the biggest threat is to future compliance with Title VII. Because
class actions have such a strong deterrent effect, if they are emasculated,
the result will be that employers will find compliance with Title VII
prohibitively burdensome. The pre-Title VII era is not so remote that
one can disregard its possible recurrence.
required. See Scheuermann, The Impact of Falcon on Title VII Class Action Litigation, 35
LAB. L.J. 10, 17 (1984).
273. Watson, 798 F.2d at 815 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) [see supra note 253 for discus-
sion of Watson].
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